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NOTES 
The Rights of Gay Prisoners: A 
Challenge to Protective Custody 
Although increased judicial and public attention has been focused on 
the rights of prisoners and of gay men and women in recent decades, 
very little attention has been paid to the men and women who are both 
gay and in prison. The problems of these prisoners range from the 
refusal of prison officials to allow any gay literature (including religious 
materials),l to negative therapy programs which attempt to "cure" 
gays,2 to parole denials based on homophobic psychiatrists' reports,3 to 
the gamut of ways that anti-gay attitudes affect adversely the gay pris-
oner's situation.4 The focus of this Note, however, is on the specific 
1. See Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975). "Publications which call 
attention or identify inmates who accept homosexuality can, in our opinion, be detrimental to 
their safety as well as to the safety of others. For that reason, we have concluded that such publi-
cations should be prohibited." Letter from Norman Carlson, Director of the U.S. Bureau ofPris-
ons, to Congressman Edward Koch (Dec. 10, 1976) (Letter on file in Southern California Law 
Review Office). 
2. See generally Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and Treatment as Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 880 (1976). See also, Note, The Constitutionality oJ 
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1626 (1974). 
3. P. BUFFUM, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PRISON 26 (1972). "Because their behavior is now per-
ceived as illness, homosexuals are subjected to more intensive treatment and often end up serving 
longer sentences than the average inmate because they do not respond, and perhaps appropriately 
so, to this form of treatment." Id q: Smith, Some Problems Encountered in J)ealing With the 
Homosexual in the Prison Situation, in CORRECTIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND TREATMENT 285, 
293 (1975) (discussing the effect of segregation and close supervision on parole). See also Warren 
v. Harvey, No. 80-2034 (2d Cir., filed May 1, 1980) (plaintiffs homosexuality cited as stressful 
factor supporting decision to deny his motion for release from state mental hospital). 
4. See, e.g., R. GIALLOMBARDO, SOCIETY OF WOMEN: A STUDY OF A WOMEN'S PRISON 44 
(1966). Giallombardo found that 83.3% of90 prison officials she questioned agreed with the state-
ment, "Homosexuality is a sin against Nature and God." Id-
A survey conducted in 1969 by one of the major television networks reported that two out of 
three Americans viewed homosexuals with disgust, discomfort, or fear. Friedman, Constitutional 
and Statutory Challenges to J)iscrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA 
L. REV. 527, 544 n.98 (1979). But a survey commissioned in 1976 by the New York Daily News 
indicated that 63% of those answering believed that homosexuals should not be subjected to dis-
crimination. Id. 
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issues raised by the traditional method of dealing with homosexuals in 
prison: isolation from the general prison population. This traditional 
segregation often results in almost twenty-four hour-a-day confinement 
to a cell, which severely limits access to programs and opportunities 
normally enjoyed by prisoners.5 
The rationales for segregating gay prisoners have rarely been 
closely examined. The original rationale was clearly punitive.6 A ther-
apeutic justification has also been presented.7 Today, corrections offi-
cials justify segregation with a protection rationale; gay men are often 
the targets of harassment and the victims of sexual assault in prison.8 
Although the dominant rationale for segregation has shifted, the depri-
vation suffered by the segregated gay prisoner remains the same. In as 
much as gay prisoners are said to be isolated for their own protection, 
an analysis of their situation requires discussion of the practice of pro-
tective custody in general. Gay men are not the only prisoners who are 
segregated for protective purposes; protective custody is used for many 
prisoners who are thought to be likely victims of prison violence for a 
wide variety of reasons, including having been convicted of particularly 
heinous crimes9 or having given testimony damaging to another in-
mate. 10 
This Note first discusses the history and current practice of segre-
gation of gay prisonersll as well as the broader subject of protective 
custody,12 and then outlines the judicial response to the problems of 
protective custody prisoners generally and gay prisoners specifically.13 
This Note then critiques the judicial confusion and resulting reluctance 
to scrutinize these segregation policies. 14 Specifically, the Note argues 
that constitutional due process requires the implementation of procedu-
5. See text accompanying notes 57-86, 92-117 infta. 
6. See text accompanying notes 59-70 infta. 
7. "An administrative segregation unit for men with serious problems of maladjustment, 
such as the problem of homosexuality, should be used as a place of confinement and treatment of 
those who are unable to adjust to the ordinary routine of the institutional program, until evidence 
of adjustment warrants return to the general population." AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 413 (1966 ed.) [Hereinafter cited as 1966 MAN-
UAL]. See, e.g., P. BUFFUN, supra note 3, at 26; notes 71-76 and accompanying text infta. 
8. See text accompanying notes 77-84 infta. 
9. See, e.g., Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F. SUpp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
10. See, e.g., Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). 
II. See text accompanying notes 57-85 infta. 
12. See text accompanying notes 44-56 infta. 
13. See text accompanying notes 86-117, 218-63 infta. 
14. See text accompanying notes 118-80,356-61 infta. 
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ral safeguards prior to any nonvoluntary assignment into protective 
custody.15 It also challenges the constitutionality of the segregation, 
protective or otherwise, of any prisoner solely on the basis of his or her 
status as a homosexual. 16 Finally, this Note argues that the due process 
clause, the eighth amendment, and the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution require major changes in the treatment of all protective 
custody prisoners, and of gay prisoners in particular. 17 
Several factors combine to make an examination of the segrega-
tion of gay prisoners particularly timely. Public attitudes toward ho-
mosexuality are becoming increasingly tolerant. 18 In recent years, gay 
men and women have successfully challenged many traditional reli-
gious and scientific perceptions about homosexuality.19 They have 
fought for the repeal of long-entrenched prohibitions against homosex-
ual activity; sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same sex 
is now decriminalized in twenty-two states.2° Furthermore, homosex-
ual status is no longer an automatic bar to government security clear-
ances21 or to naturalization as a U.S. citizen.22 
Judicial opinions have generally not kept pace with the changing 
attitudes reflected in the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment.23 The Supreme Court, for instance, has refused so far to hear 
arguments on the constitutional issues implicated by state regulation of 
homosexual conduct.24 Reflecting society's uneasiness towards homo-
sexuality, judicial opinions interpreting the civil rights of gay men and 
women have reached widely varying results.25 Some courts have recog-
15. See text accompanying notes 181-217 i'!fra. 
16. See text accompanying notes 118-80 i'!fra. 
17. See text accompanying notes 264-355 i'!fra. 
18. By comparison, the status of homosexuality was punishable by death in Colonial 
America. J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 16-22 (1976). 
19. See, e.g., Berzon, .Developing a Positive Gay Identity, in POSITIVELY GAY 4-5 (1979); L. 
SCANZONI & V. MOLLENKOTT, Is THE HOMOSEXUAL My NEIGHBOR? ANOTHER CHRISTIAN VIEW 
(1978). 
20. These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Conecticut, Deleware, Hawaii, llli-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming and Vermont. Private Sex 
.Decriminalized In Vermont,5 SEXUAL L. REP. 9 (1979). 
21. Sexual Clearances Granted to Homosexual Men, 4 SEXUAL L. REP. 50 (1978). 
22. Immigration & Naturalization-Homosexual Acts In Private-Good Moral Character, 4 
SEXUAL L. REP. 37 (1978). 
23. See Coleman, The Sexual Law Explosion: A Survey of Judicial and Legislative .Develop-
ments in Sexual Law .During the Past .Decade, 4 SEXUAL L. REP. 21, 33 (1978). 
24. See Knutson, Supreme Court Remains Aloof to Gay Rights, 4 SEXUAL L. REP. 23 (1978). 
25. Compare, Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 1039 (1970) ("Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent, lewd, and 
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nized the distinction between conduct and status:26 "homosexuality is 
not a crime."27 "Homosexuals are human beings; [they are] as much 
entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws and due process fair 
treatment as others."28 But society's anti-gay attitudes29 and confu-
sion30 about homosexuality appear to be heightened when dealing with 
gays in the peculiar situation of an enforced single-sex institution, 
which, of course, describes the vast majority of jails and prisons. 
Prison authorities have associated the control of rampant sexual activ-
ity, both voluntary and coerced, with the control of homosexual prison-
ers.31 Research indicates that this link is in error; the level of sexual 
activity among inmates (both male and female) is much too high to be 
attributed to the presence of homosexuals in the prison population.32 
Furthermore, heterosexual men are the aggressors in most prison sex-
ual assaults?3 
Attitudes concerning the rights of prisoners have also changed rap-
idly in recent years. Courts for many years followed a "hands-off" pol-
icy towards prisoners' rights, choosing instead to rely on prison 
officials' expertise and declining to interfere with internal prison ad-
ministration.34 The growing recognition that convicts do not leave all 
of their constitutional rights at the prison door has eroded this deferen-
tial position.35 Since the landmark 1944 federal appeals decision of 
obscene.") with Gay Law Students v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 14 (1979) (court equated publicly acknowledging sexual preference and working for gay 
rights with "political activity" protected by the California Labor Code, in holding that a privately 
owned public utility may not discriminate in employment because of sexual orientation). 
26. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
27. Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558, 560 (1960). 
28. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th 
Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). 
29. See generally, G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL (1972). 
30. See, e.g., Berzon, supra note 19, at 3-9. 
31. See text accompanying notes 61-70 i'!fra. 
32. See text accompanying notes 61-65 i'!fra. 
33. See text accompanying notes 66-70 i'!fra. 
34. See Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the 
"Hands-Off' .Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, Comment, Co'!frontingthe ConditionsofConjine. 
ment: An Expanded Rolefor Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 367 (1977); 
Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusalto Review the Complail/ts of 
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). 
35. The changing attitude about prisoners' constitutional rights is reflected in statutes as 
well. For instance, in 1975 the California legislature repealed the "Civil Death" section of the 
Penal Code ("A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all of the civil 
rights of the person so sentenced .... ") and replaced it with a statute reflecting concern for 
prisoners' rights ("A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may .•• be deprived of 
sucl! rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security" of 
the prison, etc.). CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1975). 
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Co.f!in v. Reichard,36 many courts have aggressively intervened to en-
sure that constitutional principles are not forgotten in the treatment of 
prisoners. For instance, courts have ordered an end to routine racial 
segregation (rejecting prison authorities' arguments that racial integra-
tion would lead to a breakdown of order),37 and have found that cer-
tain specific conditions (such as overcrowding,38 inadequate medical 
treatment,39 physical abuse by guards,40 and lack of exercise41) consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating the eighth amend-
ment. Recently, federal courts have found the entire Alabama and 
Arkansas prison systems in violation of the eighth amendment. 42 Yet, 
judicial opinions concerning prison life generally fail to cJistinguish be-
tween prisoners whose true sexual preference is homosexual, heterosex-
ual prisoners who engage in homosexual activity during incarceration, 
and prisoners who commit acts of sexual aggression. The use of the 
label "homosexuals" to describe all three groups has obscured the situ-
ation of true gay prisoners and has denied them the benefit of increased 
judicial activism on behalf of prisoners. Although very recent Supreme 
Court decisions have signalled a retreat from the Court's earlier activist 
stance regarding prisoners' rights,43 prior decisions have established" a 
body of constitutional principles that continue to protect prisoners. By 
applying constitutional principles to the practice of segregating gay 
prisoners in inferior conditions, this Note focuses on one specific aspect 
of the broader, largely unanswered question of what protections are 
required for prisoners who, for whatever reason, are thought not to fit 
into normal prison life. 
36. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). 
37. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), qfjd per curiam, 390 U.S. 
333 (1968). 
38. See, e.g., Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (D.P.R.), qfjd, 537 
F.2d 1 (1976). 
39. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Woolsey v. Beto, 450 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 
1971); Sanders v. United States, 438 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1971). 
40. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 681 (1978); Jaekson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 
1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (B.D. Ark. 1965). 
41. See, e.g., Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975). 
42. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), qfjd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), 
cerl. denied, 438 U.S. 78 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (B.D. Ark. 1970), qfjd, 442 F.2d 
304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
43. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisouers' Labor 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
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I. PRISON ADMINISTRATION 
A. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION 
A well established and recognized aspect of prison control is the re-
moval from the general prison population of assaultive, disruptive, or 
dangerous prisoners whose presence in the general population is 
thought to pose a threat to prison security. Conditions in punitive seg-
regation, sometimes called solitary confinement or 10ckup,44 have been 
the focus of a great deal of legislative4S and judicial46 attention. Al-
though the conditions of punitive segregation vary from prison to 
prison, it typically entails being confined in a cell virtually twenty-four 
hours a day, with inferior meals and severe reductions in the personal 
property allowed.47 
Disruptive prisoners are not the only category of prisoner who are 
separated from the general prison population. Prison officials also sep-
arate prisoners who are in particular danger in the general population, 
a practice known as protective custody. Protective custody prisoners 
include those who have dangerous enemies within the prison popula-
tion (for instance, because of damaging court testimony),48 and those 
who are considered easy sexual targets.49 Protective custody status is 
sometimes assigned at the prisoner's request, and sometimes without 
his or her consent.so The conditions of confinement of protective cus-
tody prisoners are often quite similar to those in which prisoners segre-
gated for punishment find themselves.sl For example, protective 
custody conditions reported in .Doe v. LalJY2 included an end to movie, 
television, and recreation privileges, twenty-two hours a day in a cell, 
and the loss of the right to good time credits.s3 The protective custody 
44. CALIFORNIA AsSEMBLY SELECT COMMllTEE ON PRISON REFORM AND REHABILITATION, 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS: ALIAS THE HOLE, LOCKUP, SOLI· 
TARY CONFINEMENT AND THE ADJUSTMENT CENTER (Sept., 1973). 
45. Id. 
46. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1976) (protective safeguards required prior to 
punitive custody assignment); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 665 (M.D. Ala. 1973) 
(scrutiny of diet and exercise in punitive segregation). 
47. See, e.g., Davidson, The Hole, in JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS 461·64 (Johnston & S~vitz 
eds. 1978). 
48. See, e.g., Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854; Breeden v. Jack· 
son, 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). 
49. See notes 77·82 and accompanying text infra. 
50. See notes 283·92 and accompanying text infra. 
51. See text accompanying notes 217·63 infra. 
52. 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979). 
53. Id. at 1349 n.7. 
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conditions detailed in Pafmigiano v. Garrahy 4 included no vocational 
training, no organized recreation, and almost total confinement within 
a dormitory of forty inmates.55 The protective custody inmates were 
forced to do without exercise or visits for periods of two weeks or more. 
Some were placed in the hospital area near inmates with serious infec-
tious diseases. 56 
B. SEGREGATION OF GAY PRISONERS 
Corrections officials have traditionally used segregation as a technique 
for dealing with homosexual prisoners. Although many modern prison 
systems do not isolate gay inmates, segregation is still standard proce-
dure in many jails and prisons for both men57 and women.58 The dom-
inant rationale for segregating male gay prisoners has shifted through 
the years from punitive, to therapeutic, to protective, although prison 
authorities have rarely enunciated their justifications clearly enough to 
make the changes precise. Since the justification for segregating gay 
prisoners is rarely articulated clearly, all three rationales are probably 
present in various degrees at various times. 
Until recently, the dominant rationale for segregating gay prison-
ers was clearly punitive. Segregation stemmed not only from moral 
54. 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979). 
55. £d. at 970. 
56. Id. at 976. 
57. Sociologist Peter C. Buffum described the former practice at Soledad Prison, in Califor-
nia, where any known homosexuals were transferred to "queen's row," a separate cell block, 
where they: "were denied access to most of the recreational, educational, and vocational training 
facilities available to the general population. TlIey were served meals segregated from the main 
population, and worked exclusively in the prison laundry. . . . So in actuality, they were in 
prison within prison." P. BUFFUN, supra note 3, at 26. Buffun reported that formal arrangement 
is no longer practiced at Soledad, but that now "many known homosexuals are transferred to ... 
the lIospital facility." Id. AntlIony Scacco noted that the Manhattan House of Detention and the 
penal installation on Rikers Island both have lock-ups for men labelled as homosexuals. A. 
SCACCO, RAPE IN PRISON 103 (1975). 
58. See K. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 374 (1973). Kathryn Burkhart reports that ''wo-
men classified as homoscxuals when they enter jail are often discriminated against, especially in 
county jails, where they are often segregated from other women and not allowed to 'mingle.''' Id. 
at 373. Until 1976, for instance, "obvious homosexuals" at Los Angeles County's jail for women 
were lIoused in a separate cell block, known as the "daddy tank." They were locked into solitary 
confinement twenty-four hours a day except for work, and were barred from special programs. 
Id. Public pressure from Los Angeles lesbians and feminists forced the closing of daddy tank in 
1976. No Touching, No Human Contact-In Cell Block 4200, LESBIAN TIDE, Nov./Dec. 1976, at 
6; Cordova, Prison Reform: New Freedoms for lJaddy-Tanked Lesbians, LESBIAN TIDE, Mar./ Apr. 
1977, at 6. Nevertheless, lesbian segregation continues in other areas of the country. BURKHART, 
supra at 373. 
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indignation59 and ignorance about homosexuality,60 but also from offi-
cial perception that homosexuals presented a serious threat to security. 
The American Correctional Association's Manual of Correctional 
Standards for Jails, 1959 Edition, illustrated this fear: 
Sex Deviates. The homosexual presents a serious problem to the 
jailer. The known homosexual should be segregated immediately. 
promptly, and completely from other inmates in the jail. The jailer 
should be under no illusions about the homosexual or a sex deviate. 
Complete isolation and at least segregation from other prisoners is 
the only method by which they may be rendered harmless within the 
jail. Otherwise. they should be fed and handled as any other in-
mate.61 
The 1964 Jail Practices and Procedures Manual published by the Cali-
fornia State Peace Officers Association illustrated similar alarm in its 
instructions about gay inmates. It advised that some homosexuals 
could be picked out by their mannerisms. "If, under close observation 
and subsequent questioning, they are found to be overt homosexuals, 
they should be segregated in a separate part of the institution where 
there will be no opportunity to contaminate other prisoners, particu-
larly young prisoners."62 
References to segregation in order to render homosexuals harmless 
and prevent contamination presumably referred to fears that the homo-
sexual prisoner would create problematic sexual activity among prison-
ers. In fact, consensual sexual activity is widespread in single-sex 
prisons for both men and women.63 However, numerous studies indi-
59. At one time, officials at the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth would put a large yel-
low "D" (for degenerate) on the backs of prisoners discovered committing a homosexual act. C. 
VEDDER & P. KING, PROBLEMS OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN CORRECTIONS 14-15 (1967). Fifteen years 
ago, officials at Iowa's correctional facility for women would Single out anyone they thought to be 
a lesbian and make her wear a yellow uniform, instead of the standard blue. K. BURKHART, SIIpra 
note 58, at 375. 
60. A standard manual for jail officials recognizes this confusion: ''The jailer sees a wide 
variety of sex offenders, including exhibitionists, window peepers, child molesters, rapists, and 
homosexuals. j)espite popular belief, these offenders are quite different from each other and pre-
sent different problems." U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE JAIL: IT'S OPERATION AND MANAGE-
MENT 92 (1970) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as JAIL MANUAL). For an example of the 
ignorance and fears of prison officials, see VEDDER & KiNG, SIIpra note 59, at 24. They warn that 
homosexual prisoners "present the officials with annoying administrative problems and .•. pose 
a constant threat to the community in which they live after release." Id. 
61. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 441-42 
(1959 ed.) [hereinafter cited as 1959 MANUAL). 
62. CALIF. STATE PEACE OFFICERS AsS'N, JAIL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 244 (1964). 
The Manual attempted to educate corrections officials about homosexuals: "True male homosex-
uals have the sexual instincts of women but the sexual organs of men ••.• Homosexuals actually 
fall in love with other men .... " Id. 
63. Researchers' estimates of the percentage of male inmates who engage in homosexual 
activity in prison range from 15%, 30-40%, 35%, 35-400/0,40%, and 40-500/0, to a finding that 80-
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cate that most prisoners who engage in sexual activities are heterosexu-
als whose homosexual activity in prison is a temporary adaptation to 
the prison environment;64 thus, gay and lesbian prisoners represent 
only a small percentage of inmates involved in sexual activity. The 
notion that prison sexual activity is caused by the presence of homos ex-
ual prisoners is further challenged by findings that the relatively few 
truly homosexual prisoners prefer to relate to other gays.65 
Another reason for the expressed goal of rendering a homosexual 
harmless by means of segregation is the identification of gay prisoners 
with the well-known serious problem in men's prisons and jails of sex-
ual assault and rape, which is generally referred to as "homosexual 
90% of prisoners who had served three years in a maximum security prison of male inmates had 
engaged in homosexual behavior in prison. P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 12-13. Sexual activity is 
equally or more common at women's institutions. Homosexual practices were noted in reports on 
women's facilities as early as 1913 and 1929. R. GIALLOMBARDO, supra note 4, at 19 nn.13 & 14. 
More recently, sociologist Rose Giallombardo found that the correctional officers and the "square 
inmates" (those least involved with the sexual aspect of inmate culture) at one facility each esti-
mated that 50-75% of the inmates were involved at some point in sexual activity with other in-
mates; the Associate Warden estimated 80%; inmates who were very much involved in the sexual 
activity estimated 90-95%. Id. at 151. David Ward and Gene Kassebaum estimated that at least 
50% of inmates at the California Institute for Women at Frontera were sexually active at least 
once during their term of imprisonment. D. WARD & G. KASSEBAUM, WOMEN'S PRISON: sEX 
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 92 (1965). They reported that all groups at the prison indicated surprise 
that their figure was not higher. Id. at n.6. 
64. Ward and Kassebaum estimated that only between 5-10% of the inmates involved in 
sexual activity were "true homosexuals"; the rest would return to heterosexual behavior after re-
lease. D. \VARD & G. KASSEBAUM, supra note 63, at 96. See BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 15-16. 
65. See, e.g., D. JARVIS, INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 92 (1978). 
There are actually two different types of homosexuals among female offenders. The 
first group is ratlIer small and includes women who were homosexual before they were 
committed. They had alrcady found the "gay" lifestyle to be more satisfying, and they 
will return to it after release. For them, such relationships are a basic way of life .... 
[T]hey are happier if they can relate to another woman who also was homosexual before 
commitment. 
Id.; see K. BURKHART, supra note 58, at 373. 
Related to the mistaken idea that gays are responsible for the sexual activity in prisons is the 
attitude that a gay person in a single-sex institution has some sort of advantage over heterosexual 
inmates. One recent corrections text perpetuates that notion: 
Another shortcut up the informal social ladder is available to offenders who are homo-
sexual or homosexually inclined. When men are isolated from women for long periods 
of time, homosexuality may become acceptable. When this happens in prison, the con-
trol of sexual favors may become a source of power and a means of reward. For exam-
ple, a homosexual inmate who plays the "female" sex role is called a 'queen,' a title of 
special status. 
D. JARVIS, supra, at 86. The harsh reality of that "special status" is reported in A. DAVIS, REPORT 
ON SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN THE PHILADELPHIA PRISON SYSTEM AND SHERIFF'S VANS (1968). Davis 
reported that gay prisoners are "readily available as male prostitutes," but he detailed that the 
availability is created "by a combination of bribery, persuasion, and the threat of force." Id. at 4; 
see P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 17. These pressures face non-gay prisoners as well, particularly if 
they are slight, young, good looking, or effeminate. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra. 
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rape."66 Scholarship in the field reveals, however, that "homosexual 
rapes" in prison are generally assaults by heterosexuals.67 The Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons recently issued a policy statement 
aimed at correcting this confusion about the role of homoscxuals in 
prison rape: 
[T]he use of the terms "homosexual assault" and "homosexual rape" 
to describe assaults or rapes committed by one prisoner on another is 
misleading. Through the use of such terms, the public is led to be-
lieve that these assaults are committed by persons who are homosex-
ual. . . . [T]he vast majority of rapes and assaults are committed by 
persons who are not homosexual .... 68 
This official statement is reinforced by the scholarship in thc field, such 
as sociologist Anthony Scacco's finding that "the sexual assaults that 
occur within prisons and jails cannot be categorized as homosexual at-
tacks, rather they are assaults by heterosexually-oriented males on 
other males for political reasons, i.e., to show power or dominance over 
other human beings."69 Alan J. Davis' report on sexual violence in the 
Philadelphia jail system noted that, "investigators were struck by the 
fact that the typical sexual aggressor does not consider himself a homo-
sexual, or even to be engaging in homosexual activity."70 The recogni-
tion that the gay prisoner is not the perpetrator of either the rampant 
consensual sex or of sexual violence among prisoners may be the cause 
of the general retreat in recent years away from an expressed punitive 
rationale for the segregation of gay prisoners. 
The practice of segregating gay prisoners has also been justified 
66. Public awareness of this problem was aroused by Philadelphia prosecutor Alan J. Davis' 
report to a Philadelphia court which concluded that "sexual assaults are epidemic in the Philadel· 
phia Prison System." A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 3. Davis found that "[vJirtually every slightly 
built young man committed by the courts is sexually approached within a day or two after his 
admission to prison. Many of these young men are overwhelmed and repeatedly 'raped' by gangs 
of inmate aggressors." A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 17; see C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 380-81, 389 (1978); G. SYKES, SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 95·99 (1958); see also 
Jacobs, Prison ViiJlence & Formal Organization, in PRISON VIOLENCE 79 (A. Cohen, G. Cole & R. 
Baileyeds., 1976). "Intense racial conflict has profoundly increased the potential for interpersonal 
violence in prison. Homosexual rape particularly seems to be characterized by its interracial ex· 
pression." Id.; see A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 34. 
Althongh isolated incidents of physically coerced sex have been reported in women's prisons 
(see, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974», authorities do not 
recognize it as a widespread problem. See K. BURKHART, supra note 58, at 381, 384; Poe v. 
Weiner, 386 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
67. See notes' 68-70 and accompanying text infra. 
68. u.s. Bureau of Prisons Policy on Reporting Rapes, 4 SEXUAL L. REP. 30 (1978). 
69. A. SCACCO, supra note 57, at 103-04. 
70. A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 37; see P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 15·16. 
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during the past thirty years by a therapeutic rationale. Much of the 
literature of the corrections field has tended to characterize homosexu-
ality as a psychological or medical problem.71 The 1959 and 1966 edi-
tions of the American Correctional Association's Manual of 
Correctional Standards described the "problem of homosexuality" as a 
"serious problem of maladjustment;m and recommended a segrega-
tion unit for such men.73 The 1970 National Sheriffs Association Man-
ual on Jail Administration recommended segregation and treatment of 
homosexuals.74 
Although this therapeutic rationale is presented in some literature 
in current use in the corrections field, the idea that homosexuality is a 
mental illness is no longer accepted by the mental health field.75 Such 
techniques as neurosurgery, electric shock, aversion therapy, and pro-
longed psychoanalysis have been used to stop homosexual activity, but 
a change in sexual preference is much harder, perhaps impossible, to 
produce.76 Thus, any attempt by prison officials to "correct" homosex-
uality is not simply a major intrusion into the prisoners privacy and 
autonomy, but is also doomed to failure. 
Thus, the premises of both the punitive and therapeutic segrega-
tion of gay prisoners have been severely shaken by current findings 
about homosexuality in general and prison life in particular. In fact, 
neither punishment nor treatment is the current dominant rationale for 
the continuing segregation of male gay prisoners; a protective rationale 
has now been overlaid upon the traditionally punitive and/or thera-
peutic practice. Corrections authorities now claim that gay prisoners 
require special treatment, often including segregation, because they are 
71. See, e.g., Loveland, Classification in the Prison System, in CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 
91,97 (P. Tappan ed. 1951) (discusses transfer of inmates "requiring special medical and psychiat-
ric treatment or training," including "homosexuals, narcotic addicts, and others"); Fuller, Medical 
Services, in CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION, supra, at 181-82 (prisoner seduced into homosexual 
acts is likely to suffer a "permanent moral degeneration" and upon release become a "confirmed 
sex pervert"). 
72. 1959 MANUAL, supra note 61, at 245; 1966 MANUAL, supra note 7, at 413. 
73. 1959 MANUAL, supra note 61, at 245; 1966 MANUAL, supra note 7, at 413. 
74. NATIONAL SHERIFF'S ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS app. C., X-54 
(1970). "Special instructions should be included in the jail rules concerning the segregation, ob-
servation, and treatment of sex deviates, and the prevention of homosexual activities." Id. 
75. For a history of the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological 
Association decisions that homosexuality is not mental illness, see L. SCANZONI & v. MOL-
LENKOTT, supra note 19, at 82-86; Berzon, supra note 19, at 5. 
76. See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 227 (1973); Note, The 
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1626 
(1974). 
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likely targets of sexual attacks. In his recent policy statement refuting 
the mistaken idea that prison rapes are committed by homosexuals," 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons pointed out that, rather 
than committing the assaults, "homosexuals are frequently the vic-
timS."78 The victimization of gay men in prison has been noted by 
some prison sociologists, and has been presented as a reason for segre-
gation. Anthony Scacco, for instance, recommends classification and 
separation of potential rape victims, in particular known homosexuals, 
although he acknowledges the limitations of this policy: "These types 
of jail-within-a-jaillockup may be a temporary answer toward protect-
ing those in prison from sexual assault; however, it is a rather lugubri-
ous remedy when one considers that, in most instances, heterosexually 
oriented males are the ones responsible for sexual attacks on other 
males."79 Alan Davis' Philadelphia study also reported that likely vic-
tims of sexual assault can be identified; the victims he studied looked 
young for the~r age, were less athletic, less physically coordinated, more 
handsome, and more effeminate than the average prisoner.80 Expert 
testimony described in .Doe v. Lally81 identified the typical victim of 
sexual assault in a Maryland prison as young, slight, and newly admit-
ted.82 The profile of a typical victim fits a stereotype of a gay man, but 
there are, of course, countless gay prisoners who are not slight, hand-
some, or effeminate.83 There are many victims who are not gay, and 
there are many gay prisoners who are not victims. Gay rights advo-
cates suggest that in light of the history of misinformation in the correc-
tions field concerning gay prisoners, categorical assumptions about 
their role as victims should also be carefully examined. 84 
In summary, prison officials have dealt with inmates who are 
77. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra. 
78. u.s. Bureau of Prisons Sets PO/ICY on Reporting Rapes, supra note 68. 
79. A. SCACCO, supra note 57, at 103-04. 
80. A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 35. 
81. 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979). 
82. It!. at 1349. See Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980). 
83. See text accompanying notes 171-72 infta. 
84. See, e.g., Kleinberg, Gay Prisoners; Literacy, Literature, Liberation, CHRISTOPHER 
STREET, Jan. 1979, at 23. 
Director Carlson uses as his major argument for the suppression of gay literature 
the supposition that the materials will "mark" the recipient, singling him out for even 
more aggravated assault .... [Flindings are based on the observation that gay men are 
harassed and sexually molested in prison, as any gay prisoner will confirm. But the 
report is inaccurate because it is euphemistic. It does not mean that gay men will be 
subject to rape it'they're identified as gay: witness Roberto, who is just one of the many 
gays who were never assaulted in prison. It means effeminate or feminine or youthful or 
slight gay men, it means non-macho or non-violent gay men will be easier marks. 
Id. at 29. 
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known or suspected to be homosexual with the traditional method of 
handling problem inmates: segregation from the general population. 
Although punitive and therapeutic rationales for the segregation have 
been articulated, the dominant purpose today is protection. Because 
the purpose of the segregation of gay men in prison is protection, the 
analysis of their situation is to a great extent an analysis of the practice 
of protective custody. As discussed earlier, gay prisoners are just one of 
several different categories of prisoners held in protective custody.85 
The deprivations which gay prisoners endure for their own protection 
are often the same as the deprivations that unpopular prisoners, or in-
mates who have given dangerous testimony, must endure. 
The basic problem shared by all protective custody prisoners, in-
cluding segregated gay prisoners, is that, through no fault of their own, 
they are confined in conditions greatly inferior to the conditions of the 
general prison population. There has not yet been any significant judi-
cial inquiry into the specific constitutional issues raised by the segrega-
tion of gay prisoners.86 Although there has been some judicial analysis 
of protective custody issues, a coherent framework for constitutional 
analysis of protective custody has not been developed by the courts. 
The protective custody system (as applied to gay and non-gay prisoners 
alike) is vulnerable to attack in two basic areas: the criteria and proce-
dures for assignment into protective custody, and the conditions of pro-
tective custody confinement once it has been imposed. 
II. REFORM OF CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY ASSIGNMENT 
A. SELECTION FOR PROTECTIVE CUSTODY 
One of the major problems with current protective custody practice is 
the lack of regular procedures to determine who is to be confined in 
protective custody. In the paradigm situation, protective custody con-
finement is available upon request to any inmates who fear for their 
safety in the general prison population. In Breeden v. Jackson 87 and 
Sweet v. South Carolina .Department of Corrections,88 for example, the 
plaintiff prisoners not only consented to, but in fact requested protec-
tive custody. There is no need for procedural safeguards prior to pro-
tective custody placement initiated by a prisoner, although periodic re-
85. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. 
86. See text accompanying notes 90-117 iifra. 
87. 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying notes 218-28 iifra. 
88. 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 229-49 iifra. 
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evaluations are necessary to ensure that protective custody continues to 
be by choice.89 
Protective custody status, however, is not always by request. Large 
numbers of prisoners are confined in protective custody without their 
consent. One of the largest identifiable categories of non-consenting 
protective custody prisoners consists of men who have been segregated 
into inferior conditions because they have been identified as homosex-
ual. The automatic segregation of homosexuals as a class with inferior 
conditions raises serious equal protection and due process problems. 
Even where the protective custody assignment is made on an individu-
alized basis, procedural due process issues are raised whenever prison-
ers are placed in protective custody (because they are gay or for some 
other reason) without their consent, or, in the alternative, whenever re-
quests for protective custody are denied. 
B. AUTOMATIC SEGREGATION OF HOMOSEXUALS: REVIEW AND 
CRITIQUE OF CASE LAW 
Although many of the constitutional arguments challenging the segre-
gation of gay men in prison are equally applicable to all protective cus-
tody prisoners, special considerations are raised when the gay prisoner 
is segregatcd because of his homosexuality. There is no coherent judi-
cial theory or even any substantial number of cases dealing directly 
with the constitutional issues surrounding the routine segregation of 
gays in jails and prisons.90 The cases generally assume that gay men 
are segregated, without examining the reasons for the routine. Chang-
ing attitudes towards homosexuality and gay rights91 are reflected in 
some of the more recent opinions, however, indicating that courts are 
now ready to examine the situation of incarcerated gay men and lesbi-
ans for the first time. 
A description of each of the handful of reported cases discuss the 
segregation of gay prisoners is an appropriate starting place. The 
plaintiffs in Smith v. Washington,92 inmates at the Washington, D.C. 
jail, filed a section 198393 action alleging constitutional deprivations be-
89. See ABA COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, COMPENDIUM OF 
MODEL CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS, IV-64 (1975) (hereinafter cited as COM-
PENDIUM]. "The cases of inmates ... in protective custody should be reviewed at least every two 
weeks." Id. 
90. See text accompanying notes 92-\17 infra. 
91. See text accompanying notes 18-28 supra. 
92. 593 F.2d \097 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
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cause of their segregation into a cellblock for homosexuals. Their ac-
tion withstood a motion for summary judgment on a jurisdictional 
challenge. The Department of Corrections claimed that the prisoners' 
allegations that accused homosexuals were segregated in inferior condi-
tions resulting in reduced "good time" credit without adequate proce-
dural safeguards did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 
$10,000 in damages. The court disagreed. This decision is a positive 
signal for successful attacks on the practice of routine segregation of 
gay prisoners. 
More typical are cases where the segregation of "known homosex-
uals" is mentioned in passing, but is not the subject of the court's atten-
tion. In McCray v. Bennett,94 the court found that due process required 
a meaningful bi-monthly review of the classifications of all prisoners 
segregated for punitive or security reasons,95 but apparently excepted 
the inmates in the segregation unit who had requested "safekeeping" or 
were "known homosexuals."96 
Careful scrutiny of the factual basis for special treatment of gays 
in prison is particularly important because unexamined assumptions 
have resulted not only in the widespread routine segregation of gay 
men and lesbians, but also in equally unexamined assumptions that 
homosexuals cannot assert simple due process claims available to other 
prisoners. In .Diamond v. Thompson,97 the court made a reference to 
homosexual prisoners that illustrates this point. The court set out pro-
cedures required for due process prior to the transfer of an inmate out 
of the general population into segregation.98 It then named two catego-
ries of inmates who do not need these safeguards: those who have es-
caped from prison and "admitted homosexuals." The court noted that 
an "admitted homosexual can be segregated for his safety or the safety 
of other inmates without elaborate procedural safeguards,"99 but that 
"such inmates should at least be notified of the reasons for transfer." 100 
The rationale stated was "reasonableness," lOl but it was not explained. 
Presumably the safeguards are unnecessary because the "admitted ho-
mosexual" has already admitted the offense for which he is being segre-
94. 467 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Ala. 1978). 
95. /d. at 193. 
96. /d. at 190. 
97. 364 F. Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
98. It!. at 665. The procedures included written notice of the charges against him, and an 
opportunity to be heard, present witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. It!. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 665 n.3. 
101. It!. at 665. 
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gated, yet the court required no showing that the inmate's status as 
homosexual actually necessitated segregation. 
Two New York cases have raised the particular problems of gay 
prisoners whose segregation denies them access to rehabilitation pro-
grams. Ex rel Ceschini v. Warden 102 raised issues surrounding the seg-
regation of gays in prison, but did not discuss them. Ceschini had been 
convicted in 1965 of two misdemeanors. Each of the two violations 
would have subjected him to not more than a one year sentence under 
the Penal Law. However, he was sentenced under the Correction Law 
to concurrent indefinite terms in the New York City Penitentiary of up 
to three years, depending on his progress towards rehabilitation. Ces-
chini complained that because he was a homosexual, he was segregated 
from the other prisoners and had, therefore, been deprived of "partici-
pating in activities, such as school, learning a trade, which would con-
tribute to [his] rehabilitation."103 The court granted a hearing to 
determine whether Ceschini was receiving rehabilitation treatment, 
noting that the purpose of the Correction Law was rehabilitation,. not 
punishment. 104 • 
People v. Wiffiams lOs presented similar circumstances. Williams 
had been sentenced to the New York City Reformatory for a maximum 
of three years. He filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that because he 
was a homosexual and thus segregated in the City Reformatory, he was 
denied access to rehabilitative programs. The writ was successful in 
forcing an order for resentencing. After hearing arguments, the trial 
court changed his sentence to the New York State Reformatory, a sen-
tence which carried a maximum of four years. Williams appealed that 
resentencing, relying on North Carolina v. Pearce,106 which requires 
that if a resentence after appeal is harsher than the original sentence, a 
valid reason for the change must be given, a rule designed to prevent 
vindictiveness on the part of the trial judge. 
The appeals court distinguished prison sentences (as in Pearce) 
from reformatory sentences (as in this case) and upheld the new four 
year sentence.107 This order was reversed unanimously less than four 
102. 30 A.D.2d 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1968). 
103. Id. at 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02. 
104. Id. at 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 202. 
105. 43 A.D.2d 531, 349 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1973), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 657, 355 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1974). 
106. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
107. 43 A.D.2d at 531, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 88. "These periods are not sentences fixed by the 
courts but rather the outside limits that a correctional authority may take in its rehabilitative 
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months later by the New York Court of Appeals,108 which found the 
lower court decision "violative of the spirit and purpose of the reason-
ing" in Pearce.109 In its very short (two paragraph) opinion the court 
reasoned that, "[i]t suffices that the prisoner was not responsible for the 
conditions which brought about, from his point of view, a more severe 
sentence." 110 
Another New York case, Ex rel Price v. Warden,111 concerned a 
prisoner imprisoned on Riker's Island who refused to be transferred to 
segregated homosexual housing. 112 As a result, he was placed first in 
punitive segregation and then in administrative (non-punitive, in this 
case) segregation. The court found that due process was substantially 
afforded, noting that hearings preceded the transfer, that Price's record 
indicated that he was homosexual, and that the transfer was made to 
deal with an exigent situation of threatened violence. l13 Of particular 
interest here is the two-judge dissent, which faced not only the question 
of the procedural due process of Price's segregation, but also "[t]he 
more complex issue ... [of] whether respondent's General Order No. 
33, segregating homosexuals from the inmate population at large is un-
constitutional on its face .... "114 
The dissenters noted that the deputy warden testified that the rea-
son for the segregation of homosexuals was that "they are a detriment 
to the good order ofthe institution,"llS a conclusion based solely on his 
own long-time experience in the prison system. Mter pointing out that 
other systems, including New York State correctional facilities, did not 
segregate homosexuals, the dissenters found "no legal justification for 
summarily compelling such segregation under the guise of 'security' 
•••• "116 The dissent called the differences in the conditions between 
the homosexual and general population of "questionable legality" and 
noted, "it clearly appears that defendant was being 'punished' for status 
efforts." Id. at 531, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 87. Two judges raised a strong objection. Id. at 532, 349 
N.Y.S.2d at 88 (Lane, J., dissenting). 
108. 34 N.Y.2d 657, 311 N.E.2d 650, 355 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1974). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. Although the court was dealing here with a harsher sentence in terms of time, the 
observation is equally relevant to sentences which are particularly harsh for gay prisoners in terms 
of conditions. 
111. 48 A.D.2d 275, 369 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1975). 
112. Id. at 276, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 131. 
113. Id. The appeal of this decision was dismissed because Price had been released. 37 N.Y. 
804, 337 N.E.2d 616, 375 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975). 
114. 48 A.D.2d at 277, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 278, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34. 
116. Id. at 279, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 134. 
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rather than for any overt criminal act."117 
c. PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF THE SEGREGATION OF GAYS 
Although courts have generally avoided dealing directly with the con-
stitutional issues surrounding the segregation of gay prisoners, the dis-
sent in Price shows the direction that such an analysis should take. 
First, the rationale for the segregation must be examined. In Price, the 
deputy warden presented no evidence except his personal experience 
that gays were a "detriment" to order as support for the compelled seg-
regation of gay prisoners. 118 As discussed earlier, the blame for ram-
pant sexual activity1l9 and sexual assaults120 in prisons should not be 
attributed to gay prisoners. The current rationale for segregation of 
male gay prisoners is protection, not punishment. 121 For that reason, 
many arguments advanced for improved conditions122 and proce-
dures123 for segregated gay prisoners generally are equally valid for all 
protective custody prisoners. Principles of eighth amendment jurispru-
dence,124 due process,125 and penological policy considerations126 com-
pel improvements in the conditions of confinement of all protective 
custody prisoners including many gay prisoners. However, when status 
(as homosexual) alone has been enough to force a prisoner into segre-
gated confinement raises new substantive due process127 and equal pro-
tection 128 arguments as well. 
1. Equal Protection 
Equal protection analysis requires an examination of the category of 
people differentiated by a state action and the relative importance of 
their deprivation. Varying standards for testing the state's interest in 
the regulation are applied depending on the nature of the group being 
distinguished and the severity of the deprivation. Traditionally, a regu-
117. Id; if. Robinson v. California, 370 U.s. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for status is cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of Fourteenth Amendment). 
118. 48 A.D.2d at 278, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34. 
119. Gay men are only a small minority of sexually active prisoners. See text accompanying 
notes 63-65 supra. 
120. Gay men are potential victims (not perpetrators) of sexual assaults in prison. See text 
accompanying notes 77-85 supra. 
121. See id. 
122. See text accompanying notes 264-355 infta. 
123. See text accompanying notes 181-217 infta. 
124. See text accompanying notes 316-24, 342-55 infta. 
125. See text accompanying notes 181-217,299-315 infta. 
126. See text accompanying notes 332-40 infta. 
127. See text accompanying notes 169-80 infta. 
128. See text accompanying notes 129-68 infta. 
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latory classification that impairs individual autonomy is upheld if the 
classification is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate 
state interest. 129 If, on the other hand, the state action affects a "funda-
mental" right or creates a "suspect" category, the regulation will be 
carefully scrutinized for the required "compelling state interest."130 
The "compelling state interest" standard is so high that its application 
almost automatically dooms the regulation. 131 But if the group ad-
versely affected by the regulation has no special claims for protection, 
and their affected interests are not deemed to be fundamental, the stan-
dard is very low, and practically guarantees that the regulation will be 
upheld. 132 The Supreme Court has also applied an intermediate stan-
dard of review for cases of discrimination against a somewhat suspect 
or "sensitive" class even though "fundamental" interests are not at 
stake. 133 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet viewed homosexuals as a 
suspect group, Professor Lawrence Tribe has suggested that homosexu-
ality eminently satisfies the criteria of "suspectness" articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Lucas,134 namely that it is "determined 
by causes not within the control of the ... individual,"13s and that it 
"bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and con-
tribute to society."136 The Court identified a "suspect class" as one 
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process."137 The history of gay people shows a 
strongly entrenched tradition of discrimination and disgrace,138 and al-
though gay men and lesbians have scored significant political victories 
recently, the entry of known homosexuals into the political arena at 
129. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Commr's, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); see 
Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and J)ue Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 689, 698-99 (1977). 
130. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see 
Bice, supra note 129, at 693-707. 
131. Bice, supra note 129, at 694. 
132. See Bice, supra note 129, at 698-702. 
133. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31, at 1089 (1978). 
134. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
135. lei. at 505. 
136. lei. L. TRIBE, supra note 133, at 944-45 n.l7; see Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 
LINCOLN L. REV. 24 (1973); Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to J)iscrimination in 
Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527, 556-58 (1979). 
137. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973). 
138. See generally, KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976). 
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any level still requires a degree of courage. 139 
The Supreme Court has generally applied a "hands-off" policy 
concerning gay rights, refusing to overturn both anti-gay and pro-gay 
decisions. 14o Nevertheless, the susceptibility of homosexual status to 
classification as suspect has crept into dictum of at least one District 
Court opinion. In Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery 
County,141 the court found that although the fact that a teacher was gay 
was not sufficient grounds to justify his transfer or dismissal, when the 
teacher made radio and television appearances sparking controversy 
beyond the needs of his defense, the school board's refusal to renew his 
contract was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court noted, how-
. ever, that: "Corollary to the proposition that ordered liberty protects 
private, consenting, adult homosexuality is the notion that discrimina-
tion directed at such activity is 'suspect' under the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."142 The court pointed to the 
opinion of four judges in Frontiero v. Richardson 143 that sex is a suspect 
classification, and commented, "While from this, it does not necessarily 
follow that sexual preference is similarly 'suspect' as a classification, the 
broad thrust of the opinion of the court substantially supports extrapo-
lation .... "144 
Although homosexual status in theory fits the criteria for "suspect 
classification," the Supreme Court is not likely to afford gay people the 
protection of strict scrutiny in the near future. 145 The court, however, 
has developed a middle-range "sensitive classification" which triggers 
an intermediate review. 146 The court has placed such groups as 
aliens147 and illegitimates148 into this category. Professor Tribe de-
scribed a sensitive class: "Whether or not the groups in question might 
qualify for treatment as 'discrete and insular minorities,' they bear 
139. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1978, § 2, at 13, col. 3 (Harvey Milk, first acknowledged 
gay San Francisco supervisor, slain). See generally oUT OF THE CLOSETS-VOICES OF GAY LID-
ERATION (K. Jay & A. Young eds.). 
140. See Knutson, supra note 24, at 23. 
141. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), o/J'd in parI and rev'll in parI, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), 
cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). 
142. It!. at 852. The court had noted: "In this context, the time has come today for private, 
consenting, adult homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protectable interests. Intol-
erance of the unconventional halts the growth of liberty." It!. at 851. 
143. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
144. 359 F. Supp. at 852. 
145. See Knutson, supra note 24. 
146. See Bice, supra note 129, at 702-07. 
147. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1975). 
148. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
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enough resemblance to such minorities to warrant more than a casual 
judicial response when they are injured by law."149 Gay men and les-
bians are more likely to be afforded this middle level of protection. So 
far, however, anti-gay discrimination cases have been decided on 
grounds other than equal protection. 150 
Equal protection analysis also requires an examination of the na-
ture of the interests at stake. Gay prisoners' complaints range from 
relatively minor ones, such as the monitoring of gay prisoners' show-
ers, lSI to the common problem of gays being kept in solitary confine-
ment equivalent to punitive segregation. 152 Such separate confinement 
can result in gay prisoners being deprived of access to rehabilitative 
programs,153 and it can result in limited access to fundamental inter-
ests, such as access to the courts (by means of library privil~ges)154 or 
religious practice. ISS The infringement of a fundamental interest trig-
gers the protection of strict scrutiny.156 If the interests at stake are 
deemed important, although not necessarily fundamental, an interme-
diate review can be triggered. 157 
149. L. TRIBE, supra note 133, § 16-31, at 1090. 
ISO. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 
836 (1976); Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 
F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H. 1974). 
lSI. Poe v. Werner, 386 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
152. See text accompanying notes 264-67 i'!fra. 
153. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 43 A.D.2d 531, 349 N. Y.S.2d 86, rev'd on other grounds, 34 
N.Y.2d 657, 355 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1973); People ex rel Ceschini v. Warden, 30 A.D.2d 649, 291 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (1968); text accompanying notes 274-82 supra. 
154. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
ISS. See, e.g., Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
156. See Bice, supra note 129, at 693-702. 
157. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Bell v. Bur-
son, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
Professor Tribe has identificd a third, less explicit consideration of the court in deciding 
whether to scrutinize the government regulation at the intermediate level. "If a rule is imbedded 
in a setting characterized by institutional rigidity to change, so that shifting social and moral 
norms are less likely to be reflected in modifications of the rule, the propriety and probability of 
intermediate scrutiny both increase." L. TRIBE, supra note 133, § 16-31, at 1091. "[l]ntermediate 
review ... will be most appropriate when the legislative and administrative processes seem sys-
temically resistant to change." Id. at 1091-92. The refusal of many prison authorities to integrate 
their prisons racially without court interference is just one of many examples in the history of 
prison reform that point to the applicability of this consideration to the situation of gays in prison. 
See, e.g., McClelland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 829 (D. Neb. 1971), ajjd per curiam, 456 F.2d 1266 
(8th Cir. 1972); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), ajjd per curiam, 390 U.S. 
333 (1968). 
The McClelland district court stated: 
Threats of recalcitrant prisoners whose racial prejudices are erected to defy the constitu-
tional rights of black prisoners need to be quashed. The prisoners who threaten violence, 
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Identification of homosexuals as a "sensitive" class requires that 
the state's purposes in segregating gay prisoners stand up to at least an 
intermediate level of scrutiny, whatever the interests at stake. The chief 
rationale for the confinement (or other special conditions) of gay pris-
oners is prison security, although that purpose has been largely unex-
amined by the courts. 158 The one judge who has questioned the 
rationale for compelled segregation of gay prisoners found the official's 
explanation of the policy ("they are a detriment to the good order of 
the institution")159 woefully inadequate.160 The tradition of segrega-
tion of gay men and lesbians was founded oIl: fears and misconceptions 
about homosexuality. 161 Literature of the corrections field and ac-
counts of prison experiences indicate that the traditional punitive atti-
tude toward gays is still very much in evidence. 162 Any special 
treatment of gay prisoners needs to be carefully scrutinized, then, to be 
sure that the hidden rationale for the treatment is not in fact punish-
ment for the status of being gay.163 
As discussed earlier, the current dominant rationale for the segre-
gation of male gay prisoners is protection from sexual assault. l64 Place-
ment in protective custody has traditionally been based on an 
assessment of an individual prisoner's need for protection, and has 
been assigned at the request of the prisoner.165 But segregation of gay 
prisoners has been accomplished with special rules putting gay prison-
ers, as a group, in a special class.166 Yet there is evidence that some, 
but not all, gay prisoners fit the pattern of being likely targets of sexual 
assault. 167 More individualization of selection is a standard remedy for 
equal protection infirmities. Prison officials could accommodate secur-
ity needs without classifying all gays into a special category by institut-
ing more precise procedures for individualized determinations of 
assignment into protective custody, using such factors as age, weight, 
rather than those who seek their right to nondiscriminatory treatment, should be the ones 
to feel the weight of the consequences of their overt bigotry. 
327 F. Supp. at 834. 
158. See text accompanying notes 90-117 supra. 
159. 48 A.D.2d at 278,369 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34; see text accompanying notes 111-17 supra. 
160. Id. 
161. See text accompanying notes 59-84 supra. 
162. See, e.g., Lemmond, Charges of Abuse and Rape al New Mexico Slale Prison, Aug.-Sept., 
1978, in UNITY 6; text accompanying notes 59-84 supra. 
163. See ex rei. Price v. Warden, 48 A.D.2d at 278-79,369 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34. 
164. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra. 
165. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra. 
166. See text accompanying notes 57-85 supra. 
167. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra. 
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and strength. Certainly a prisoner's status as homosexual could be a 
weighty factor in support of his request for protective custody. If the 
prisoner does not seek protective custody, the same procedural safe-
guards that accompany possible assignment into punitive custody 
should be triggered by a protective custody assignment. 168 
2. Substantive .Due Process 
Due process principles offer an alternative ground for invalidation of 
automatic segregation of gay prisoners. As discussed previously, any 
punitive or therapeutic segregation lacks credible justification, leaving 
it open to attack even under a deferential, minimum rational basis stan-
dard. Protection is now the common rationale for the segregation of 
gay prisoners. I69 Although it roses in the equal protection analysis, the 
problem of a lack of correlation between a prisoner's sexual preference 
and the likelihood of his becoming a victim is also a substantive due 
process issue. Substantive due process requires that a regulation that 
intrudes on a person's autonomy must be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest. 170 Protection is the only defensible rationale for the 
segregation of many gay men in prison, but it does not seem to be a 
defensible rationale for the segregation of all gay men in prison. Re-
search indicates that inmates who are young, handsome, non-athletic, 
slight, and/or effeminate are likely targets of assault. 171 The descrip-
tion of a likely victim thus fits in several ways the stereotype of a gay 
man. It could be, then, that prison officials have used the term ''homo-
sexual" to identify effeminate men, who they marked as likely victims. 
Effeminacy is not a rational determinant of homosexuality, however; 
research indicates that only between ten to fifteen percent of the male 
gay population evince effeminate characteristics.172 Thus, the majority 
of gay inmates do not fit the mold of likely potential victims. 
168. See text accompanying notes 181-217 i'!fra. 
169. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra. 
170. See Bice, supra note 129, at 707-11. 
171. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra. 
172. Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687, 702 (1973); see ABA 
COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS, 
PRISONS AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 35-36 (1974): 
Id. 
Appearances May Deceive. Contrary to popular belief, it is not possible to identify a 
homosexual by his appearance. All too often we tend to follow uninformed and 
prejudiced opinion and consider those persons to be homosexual whose walk, gestures, 
and way of talking seem to be feminine. Slimness and a delicate appearance are also 
mistakenly considered signs of homosexuality. The jailer must recognize his own 
prejudices and not make the mistake of considering all slim, youthful prisoners as homo-
sexual. The consequences to the prisoner can be very serious. 
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The question for those prisoners is whether special rules which re-
quire their segregation solely because they are gay have any relation-
ship to the goal of reducing prison violence. In Bono v. Saxbe,173 the 
court held that efforts to determine whether an inmate would be able to 
function in the prison setting violated substantive due process for pris-
oners who were separated based on the crime for which they were con-
victed, because there was no correlation between that criterion and the 
harm to be prevented. 174 A blanket assertion that gay prisoners need 
protective segregation is vulnerable to the same attack. Thus, the anal-
ysis of the due process rights of any gay prisoner requires an examina-
tion of the rationality of the regulations as applied to that prisoner after 
the stereotypes are stripped away. 
Although courts have not yet addressed this issue with regard to 
gay prisoners, analogous reasoning in an employment case is worth 
noting. In Saa! v. Middendoif, 175 the court found that an automatic 
ban of all homosexuals from the Navy was "irrational and capricious" 
as applied to the plaintiff, 176 and thus violative of her fifth amendment 
due process rights. (The court cited "serious equal protection 
problems"177 that it did not reach.) The Navy, like many prison offi-
cials, expressed fear of disruptions caused by personnel who detest gay 
men and lesbians. 178 The Navy's proposed remedy was also strikingly 
similar to that promoted by prison authorities: homosexuals are "mili-
tary liabilities who cannot be tolerated in a military organization. . . . 
Their prompt separation is essential."179 The court decided that in the 
plaintiff's case, "prompt separation" was neither essential, nor even ra-
tional. 18o 
The segregation of gay prisoners for punitive or therapeutic pur-
poses has been discredited. A prisoner's status as homosexual does not 
automatically make him a likely victim of prison violence in need of 
protective segregation. Thus, automatic segregation of many gay pris-
oners fails to meet minimum rationality requirements of due process. 
Thus, the automatic channelling of all gay prisoners into separate ho-
mosexual confinement creates serious equal protection and due process 
173. 450 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Ill. 1978). 
174. Id. at 934. 
175. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
176. Id. at 202. 
177. Id. at 202 n.13. 
178. Id. at 201 n.l0. 
179. Id. at 201. 
180. Id. at 202. 
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violations. An end to automatic segregation for all gay prisoners does 
not solve the protective custody assignment problem, however. Even 
where protective custody assignments are made on an individualized, 
case-by-case basis, constitutional due process requires procedural safe-
guards to protect prisoners from incorrect assignments. 
3. Procedural.Due Process Protection Prior to Protective Custody 
Procedural due process issues are raised whenever any prisoners are 
placed in protective custody without their consent, or when prisoners' 
requests for protective custody are denied. The determination of what 
procedural safeguards (if any) are constitutionally compelled requires 
an analysis of whether assignment to protective custody deprives the 
prisoner of a liberty or property interest protected by the due process 
clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment.18l In Wolff v. McDon-
nell182 the Supreme Court recognized that significant procedural due 
process safeguards were required prior to placement into punitive cus-
tody, but in Moody v . .Dagget~183 the Court indicated that individual 
classification decisions did not require constitutional due process pro-
tections. 184 Involuntary protective custody contains elements of both 
punitive custody and administrative classification. It is like an admin-
istrative classification decision in that there is no allegation of wrong-
doing that triggers the special confinement. But it is like punitive 
custody in its effect upon the prisOIier, and because the confinement is 
caused by allegations of particular factual circumstances-in this case, 
that the prisoner needs protection. A determination of the procedural 
requirements prior to assignment to protective custody is complicated 
by the hybrid identity of protective custody. 
Addressing the rights of a prisoner accused of wrongdoing, the 
181. See Bice, supra note 129, at 711. 
182. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
183. 429 U.S. 78 (1976). 
184. Id. at 88 n.9. See Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980). Here, the court 
rejected the claim of two federal prisoners that their interest in avoiding "central monitoring case" 
classifications entitled them to due process protections prior to being so classified. The Pugliese 
decision emphasized the reluctance of the current Supreme Court to impose due process safe-
guards on prison officials. Id. at 921-25. One part of the court's analysis could be helpful to due 
process claims, however. The court noted that, in making the determination of whether a pris-
oner's interest is constitutionally protected, "[c]onsiderable weight is given to whether the alleged 
liberty interest is in the nature of 'a bird in the hand' rather than one in the bush." Id. at 922. In 
Pugliese, the prisoners complained that the special classification delayed or precluded their access 
to such benefits as furloughs or work release. Id. at 923. In addition to jeopardizing these poten-
tial future benefits, assignment into protective custody can mean the immediate withdrawal of 
benefits that the prisoner currently enjoys. 
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Wolf decision held that "the prisoner's interest [in keeping good-time 
credits] has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Four-
teenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum proce-
dures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due 
Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily 
abrogated."18s The Court found that a prisoner threatened with loss of 
good-time credits due to serious misconduct had a right to advance no-
tice of the charges against him,186 a limited right to present evidence 
and call witnesses on his behalf,187 and the right to a written statement 
of the reasons for the result of the hearing.188 Of particular importance 
to protective custody analysis is the Wolff court's statement that soli-
tary confinement was equivalent to the loss of good-time credits, and 
thus required the same safeguards. 189 Wolff, then, stands for a proce-
dural due process requirement of significant safeguards prior to any 
punitive custody assignment. 
The Supreme Court clarified the source of a prisoner's procedural 
due process claim in Meachum v. Fano. 190 
In Meachum the Supreme Court refused to extend the Wolffright 
to a factfinding hearing to a prisoner faced with transfer to another 
prison, even if the transfer was a form of punishment. 191 The 
Meachum decision was based in part on the knowledge that, 
"[c]onfinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal 
limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State 
to impose."192 The Court explained that the Wolff protections were 
based on a liberty interest originating in state law,193 namely the rule 
185. 418 U.S. at 557. 
186. Id. at 563-64. 
187. Id. at 566-67. 
188. Id. at 564-65. 
)89. [I]t would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish be-
tween the procedures that are required where good time is forfeited and those that mUst 
be extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a major change 
in the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and 
proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good time, 
there should be minimum procedural safeguards .... 
Id. at 571-72 n.19. Since the court was not addressing the issue of protective custody, perhaps the 
"normally" is a reference to the fact that in some cases the confinement is protective, rather than 
punitive. The "major change in the conditions of confinement" is the same whether the label is 
punitive or protective. 
190. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
191. Id. at 227. 'See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). 
192. 427 U.S. at 225. 
193. A strong dissent took issue with this understanding of the source of the liberty interest. 
Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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that good time would normally only be forfeited (or solitary confine-
ment imposed) because of serious misbehavior.194 Thus, the Court 
looked for a state regulation or statute limiting official discretion in 
making prisoner transfers, which it took to be the necessary source of 
any liberty interest or entitlement in not being transferred. Finding no 
such statute or regulation, the Court held that ''whatever expectation 
the prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he 
behaves himself, it is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger proce-
dural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion 
to transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all."195 The 
source and extent of due process protections against changes in the con-
ditions or circumstances of a prisoner's confinement is an area of a 
great deal of litigation and much confusion as courts attempt to recon-
cile Wolff and Meachum. 
There are two basic strands to the argument that due process re-
quires procedural safeguards prior to an involuntary protective custody 
assignment. The first argument stresses that protective custody confine-
ment is substantially similar fo punitive segregation, which requires 
due process safeguards under Wolff. The second follows Meachum and 
focuses on whatever statutes or regulations may be said to have created 
a liberty interest in staying out of protective custody. The first argu-
ment is supported by correctional scholarship which stresses the puni-
tive nature of protective custody conditions.196 The model standards of 
the National Sheriff's Association also make the point that even when 
the inmate requests segregation for protective custody, "segregation has 
an inherently punitive quality that requires the imposition of special 
safeguards." 197 The first argument is strongest in the many prison sys-
tems where protective custody conditions are exactly like punitive cus-
tody conditions, except that protective custody confinement typically 
lasts longer. A 1978 district court faced with this question applied this 
reasoning. Murphy v. Fenton 198 held that where protective custody 
meant being locked in a cell continuously except for two hours a week 
for exercise and showers, "prolonged incarceration. . . against an in-
194. Id. at 226. 
195. Id at 228. 
196. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, supra note 65 at 6; Jacobs, supra note 66, at 82. 
197. COMPENDIUM, supra note 89, at 34; if. Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537,541 (1st eir. 
1974), cerl. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974). (''We now read Wolff as determining what procedures are 
due by evaluating the substantiality of the loss to the inmate and balancing that loss against the 
burden procedures would put on prison administrators, not by focusing on the purpose or motive 
of the action proposed.") 
198. 464 F. Supp. 53 (M.D. Pa. 1978). 
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mate's will implicates a liberty interest protected by procedural due 
process."199 The court analogized to the procedural due process safe-
guards required by Wolff prior to disciplinary segregation and rea-
soned that equal protection principles mandate protections for 
protective custody prisoners as well.2°O 
In Taylor v. Clement,201 another post-Meachum protective custody 
case, the court held that the plaintiff inmates were denied due process 
when they were placed in protective custody involuntarily without a 
hearing under conditions indistinguishable from punitive segregation. 
The Taylor court was confronted with one of the practical problems of 
a system which offers procedural safeguards prior to punitive segrega-
tion but not prior to protective segregation, even when the conditions 
are identical. If merely changing the label to something other than pu-
nitive custody removes the protection of procedural safeguards, the 
Wolff procedures could be denied any prisoner. The Taylor court 
looked behind the protective custody label: "[W]e take it to be axio-
matic that prison officials cannot avoid their due process responsibili-
ties simply by relabelling the punishments imposed on prisoners within 
their charge."202 The court required evidence from the prison officials 
that the purpose of confinement was in fact safety, not punishment, but 
none was forthcoming.203 The court did not reach the question of 
whether a prisoner really segregated for his or her own protection 
would be entitled to procedural safeguards.204 However, by ordering 
prison officials to pay damages to prisoners who were improperly as-
signed to protective custody, the court implied that some standards and 
safeguards were necessary. The court also ordered the prison to create 
a distinction between conditions in punitive and protective custody.2°S 
Any argument which focuses solely on the negative effect of pro-
tective custody on the prisoner is undercut by the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Meachum. The Meachum decision did not analyze the extent 
of the deprivation suffered by the prisoner; rather, it focused the analy-
sis on whether the state had created an entitlement which identified a 
protected liberty interest. Under Meachum, the extent of compelled 
199. Id. at 57. 
200. Id. at 58. 
201. 433 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
202. Id. at 587-88. 
203. Id. at 588. The prisoners were awarded damages of $25.00 for each day of confinement 
in "protective custody." Id. at 589. 
204. Id. at 587. 
205. Id See text accompanying notes 124-258 i'!fta. 
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due process protections prior to protective custody confinement de-
pends on whether the applicable statutes, regulations, and policies con-
cerning protective custody or the general prison confinement have 
created a sufficient interest in remaining outside of protective custody 
to warrant due process protection. Thus, the due process protection 
depends to a great extent on the statutes, regulations, and policies of 
each individual prison and state. Predictably, courts have given differ-
ing answers to the question of whether a prisoner has a protected lib-
erty interest in not being assigned to protective custody against his 
wishes. In Spain v. Procunier,206 the district court required a "duly no-
ticed hearing with appropriate due process safeguards" prior to invol-
untary assignment to protective custody in the Adjustment Center at 
San Quentin State Prison.2°7 In Wright v. Enomoto,2°8 the court found 
that the prisoner had a protected interest (conferred by regulations) in 
not being confined in non-punitive segregation without protective safe-
guards. (The court noted that non-punitive segregation could be worse 
than punitive confinement because of the longer time period.209) In 
Bills v. Henderson,2l0 however, the distinction between punitive and 
nonpunitive segregation cut the other way. The court found, that based 
upon Tennessee laws and administrative guidelines, failure to provide 
inmates with a written record of the hearing which determined their 
placement in punitive segregation was violative of due process. But 
involuntary placement into nonpunitive segregation implicated no lib-
erty interest, even though the same cell-block was used for both forms 
of segregation.211 
One of the flaws of the Meachum state entitlement liberty interest 
analysis is that it creates an incentive for officials to adopt policies and 
regulations that provide the prisoner with only minimum guarantees 
and protection.212 For instance, the 1978 Federal Draft Standards for 
Corrections of the Department of Justice presently provide for involun-
tary protective custody only upon a showing of "substantial evidence 
that protective custody is warranted."213 Perhaps because that rule 
206. 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd in parI, mod!fied in parI and rev'd in parI, 600 
F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). 
207. 408 F. Supp. at 539. 
208. 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd mem., 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). 
209. Id. at 403-04. See text accompanying notes 341-55 supra. 
210. 446 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). 
211. Id. at 973. See Reed v. Hadden, 473 F. Supp. 658, 660-61 (D. Colo. 1979). 
212. See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1977). 
213. As provided by the DEP'T OF JUSTICE 1978 FEDERAL DRAFT STANDARDS FOR CORREC-
TIONS [hereinafter cited as DRAFT STANDARDS]: 
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could be construed to create a liberty interest in remaining in the gen-
eral prison population, that section of the draft "is being further con-
sidered in light of recent court decisions."214 Under the Meachum 
analysis, the only major restraint to prevent the drafting of regulations 
which are designed to be so vague that they avoid creating any liberty 
interest is the principle of minimal substantive due process; any regula-
tions which do not provide the prisoner with some understanding of his 
or her situation and an opportunity to change it are arguably arbitrary 
and capricious,21s As Justice Stevens pointed out in the Meachum dis-
sent, "even the inmate retains an inalienable interest in liberty-at the 
very minimum the right to be treated with dignity."216 
The procedural due process claim of a prisoner whose request lor 
protective custody was denied would also depend on the identification 
of some liberty interest in the protective custody status. The prisoner 
would look to prison practice or regulations to show a reasonable ex-
pectation of placement in protective custody if his safety in the general 
prison population was in doubt.217 The procedural due process argu-
ments discussed above are only useful to establish regular procedures 
for the determination of who gets in and who stays out of protective 
custody. They do not reach the protective custody conditions them-
selves. 
III. REFORM OF THE CONDITIONS OF 
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY 
Reform in the area of placement into protective custody does not solve 
all protective custody inequities. Once protective custody has been as-
signed, the prisoner (who is often gay) is confronted with living condi-
tions which are much more restricted than the conditions of the general 
prison population. In fact, the conditions of protective custody are 
often exactly the same as those imposed on prisoners whose segregation 
Written policy and procedure provide that admission to the administrative segrega-
tion unit for purposes of protective custody is made only where there is substantial evi-
dence that protective custody is warranted, or unless the inmate provides written consent 
to such confinement. Where an inmate consents to administrative segregation, the in-
mate may at any time request assignment to the general inmate population, and such 
req uests shall be granted, unless there is substantial evidence to show that protective 
custody in the unit is absolutely necessary. 
Id. at 58. 
214. Id. at 58 n.2. 
215. See Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975). 
216. 427 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
217. The prisoner could also have an eighth amendment action against the prison officials 
based on their duty to provide a reasonable level of safety. See text accompanying notes 277-97 
i'!fra. 
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is punishment for a disciplinary infraction. Protective custody condi-
tions can be challenged in two ways. First, the system of subjecting 
prisoners in need of protection to conditions worse than general prison 
confinement and equivalent to punitive segregation is vulnerable to be-
ing struck down on a number of constitutional grounds. Second, even 
without making any comparison between protective custody and the 
confinement in the general prison population or in punitive custody, 
the typically extended duration of protective custody raises special 
eighth amendment concerns as to the impact of the prolonged depriva-
tions on the prisoner. 
A. FORCING DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PROTECTIVE 
AND PUNITIVE CUSTODY 
1. Current Case Law 
The protective custody system is vulnerable to a direct constitutional 
attack because of the practice of protecting potential victims by impos-
ing the same conditions of confinement as for punishment of other pris-
oners being disciplined. Several significant cases have addressed this 
issue. 
Breeden v. Jackson218 was an action by a prisoner for damages 
from Virginia prison officials. Nathan Breeden had been transferred to 
maximum security confinement at his own request because of threats to 
his life. The court rejected Breeden's claim that the deprivations im-
posed on him in maximum security constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment prohibited by the eighth amendment. The majority noted that 
Breeden was free to leave maximum security because prison officials 
had found no verification of the threats.219 The conditions of which 
Breeden complained were exactly the normal conditions of punitive 
solitary confinement, including limited recreational opportunities and 
restricted bathing privileges. The opinion cited several cases where 
similar solitary confinement conditions had not been found to be in 
violation of the eighth amendment.22o 
In dissent,221 Judge Craven stressed the prevalence of violence at 
218. 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). 
219. Id. at 579. 
220. Id. at 581. The court noted that Breeden's complaints did not include mental abuse, 
physical injuries, or being forced to sleep nude on a concrete floor, all of which had been found to 
be cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 579-80. 
221. Id. at 581 (Craven, J., dissenting). Judge Craven expressed disinterest in the prayer for 
damages and found that although Breeden had already been paroled, the case was not moot be-
cause his parole could be revoked. 
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the prison,222 and noted that the alleged conditions in maximum secur-
ity were no exercise, two meals a day of leftovers, one cold shower and 
shave a week, one visitor a month, and no personal belongings.223 
Judge Craven found that "the time has come to enunciate clearly to 
prison administrators that it is their responsibility to protect life and 
that they may not condition such protection on relinquishment of 
earned prison privileges.,,224 Craven also challenged the voluntariness 
of Breeden's request for maximum security: "Since the alternative was 
alleged to be personal injury and possible death, 1 think he was given 
no real choice."225 "I do not believe the state may constitutionally put 
such a choice to a prisoner, but, instead, must assume its responsibility 
to provide a reasonably safe place of imprisonment."226 Craven noted 
that "abdicat[ing] control of prisons to the rule of terror of the inmate 
'bulls' " constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that "subject-
ing a well-behaved prisoner to deprivations imposed as punishment 
upon unruly prisoners ... [amounted to] arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."227 He recommended remanding for an evidentiary hearing that 
might reveal "institutional treatment . . . as to shock general con-
science .... "228 
The Fourth Circuit judges convened en banc to consider the case 
of Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections.229 James Sweet 
had been in segregated confinement for his own protection for almost 
five years, following an incident where Sweet apparently (although the 
record was confused) either reported a knife attack on himself or in-
formed in connection with a riot.230 Sweet requested segregated con-
finement because "his presence in the general population would place 
him in danger of serious bodily harm, if not death,"231 an assessment 
222. Id. at 581 n.1. (Judge Craven cited a news account ofa fatal stabbing at Breeden's prison 
the previous month). 
223. Id. at 581-82 n.2. 
224. Id. at 581. 
225. Id. at 581-82. 
226. Id. at 582. 
227. Id. The dissent finally pointed out that the majority relied heavily upon Smith v. Swen-
son, 333 F. Supp. 1253 (D.O. Mo. 1971), for judicial approval of maximum security protective 
custody, although the inmate in that case was charged with stabbing another prisoner. Id. at 581 
n.3. 
228. Id. (quoting Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965». 
229. 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975). 
230. Id. at 857. 
231. Id. at 858. 
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with which the prison warden agreed.232 Sweet brought the action 
seeking privileges in addition to those afforded prisoners punitively 
segregated, as well as monetary relief.233 
The majority began its analysis by citing the threshold principle 
that courts should only intervene in prison administration if the condi-
tion or practice "reaches the level of an unconstitutional depriva-
tion."234 The court reviewed how these principles have been applied to 
segregated confinement, establishing minimum standards for such 
areas as " 'basic sanitation and nutrition.' ,,235 The court then consid-
ered Sweet's specific complaints, and with two exceptions, found that 
the conditions of Sweet's confinement met the constitutional standards 
for segregated custody.236 The court did express concern, however, 
about Sweet's complaints of inadequate exercise time, and to a lesser 
extent, shower opportunities, because of his lengthy indefinite stay in 
segregation. On those issues the court remanded for additional testi-
mony.237 
Three judges who preferred the limited remedy of the majority to 
the district court's dismissal filed a special concurrence, claiming that 
the majority's judgment did not "provide the full remedy that the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution require.'>238 
The concurrence, written by Judge Butzner, noted that the district court 
accepted the Warden's assessment that Sweet's protective custody was 
voluntary, in spite of the warden's own testimony that "the population 
is dangerous to him."239 Butzner repeated the holding of Woodhaus v. 
Virginia240 that "[a] prisoner has a right, secured by the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments, to be reasonably protected from constant 
threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates . . . ."241 
Therefore, concluded the concurrence, "the only issue in this case is the 
constitutionality of the means employed by the state to provide protec~ 
232. Id. at 867 n.1 (Butzner, J., concurring). 
233. Id. at 857-59. 
234. Id. at 859. 
235. Id. at 860 (quoting Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 404 
U.S. 1049 (1972». Several of Sweet's complaints were dismissed as simply untrue. Id. at 862. 
236. Id. at 864-65. 
237. Id. at 866. Aside from this limited remand, the court affirmed the district court decision, 
which included dismissal of the claim for a monetary judgment. Id. 
238. Id. at 867 (Butzner, J., concurring). 
239. Id. at n.1. 
240. 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973). 
241. 529 F.2d at 867 (Butzner, J., concurring) (quoting Woodhaus v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 
890 (4th Cir. 1973». 
1258 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1225 
tion."242 Butzner pointed out that the cases cited by the majority estab-
lish that segregated confinement is a constitutionally permissible form 
of punishment for infractions of the prison rules, but that these deci-
sions do not address "the constitutionality of using solitary confinement 
for an indefinite time to guard a prisoner who has violated no rules."243 
The concurrence noted that the premise of cases sanctioning punish-
ment by solitary confinement is that prison officials need to discipline 
unruly prisoners for prison security, but that "discipline is not pro-
moted by placing the victims in solitary confinement while those who 
threaten them enjoy the privileges of prisoners at large."244 Judge 
Butzner cited the principles of Wolf v. Mc.Donnell that "a prisoner is 
not shorn of all constitutional rights,"245 and that "among those which 
he retains is immunity from the arbitrary and capricious imposition of 
punishment for breaking prison disciplinary rules.,,246 He pointed out 
that Sweet had broken no rules, and that "a preference for solitary con-
finement over the probability of death is not a real choice."247 The 
three concurring judges perceived due process, equal protection, and 
eighth amendment violations: 
Confining him as though he has breached prison rules, when in fact 
he has not, is so arbitrary and capricious that it deprives him of due 
process of law. And placing him in the same class as lawless prison-
ers, though he is not lawless, denies him the equal protection of the 
law . . . . Measured by the prison's own standards of punishment, 
his solitary confinement is clearly disproportionate to his conduct 
and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the eighth amendment.248 
These judges recommended that the warden "submit a plan for impris-
oning Sweet without depriving him of the privileges accorded other 
prisoners. . . ."249 
The next appeals court case to raise these issues was Nadeau v. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 867-68. 
247. Id. at 868. 
248. 529 F.2d at 868. 
249. Id. at 869. The judges suggested the possibility of providing for either additional guards 
or transferring Sweet. They argued that the possibility of additional expense "is not a justification 
for retaining him in solitary confinement in violation of his constitutional rights." Id. See Finney 
v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194,201 (8th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 
580 (8th Cir. 1968). 
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Hefgemoe,250 in the First Circuit. This suit was brought on behalf of 
thirty-five prisoners being held at their own request in protective cus-
tody in a New Hampshire state prison. The prisoners challenged the 
conditions of their confinement on first, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth 
amendment grounds. The district court found largely in favor of the 
prisoners. It noted that although the specific circumstances of each 
prisoner's case were different, all "are housed in the protective custody 
unit because they believe, and the prison administration concurs, that 
there would be a real threat to their physical or mental well-being were 
they to remain in the main cell block."251 After a detailed description 
of the circumstances of confinement in "the Annex," the area of protec-
tive custody, the court turned to the question of the voluntariness of the 
segregation, cited the reasoning of both the Breeden dissent252 and the 
Sweet concurrence,253 and found that the request for protective custody 
did not "constitute a waiver of any claims concerning the conditions of 
their confinement,"254 because the prisoners have a "statutory and con-
stitutional right to be reasonably protected from bodily harm. . . ."255 
The court then focused on the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment, applying a "penological justification test." 
This test required "some penological reason for the lack of privileges 
afforded the plaintiff class .... "256 Noting that the privileges given to 
the general population presumably had a penological purpose, the 
court found that the reduction of privileges in protective custody, in-
cluding inferior meals and limited access to showers, exercise, rehabili-
tation, and visitors, did not meet this test. 257 
The court of appeals rejected the eighth amendment penological 
justification test used by the lower court because of its impracticality 
and lack of good authority.258 The court cited Breeden, Sweet, and five 
other cases259 to show that courts have rejected the claims made by 
nondisciplinary inmates in protective confinement for the same privi-
250. 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), '!/J'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 561 
F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977). 
251. /d. at 1254-55. 
252. See text accompanying notes 221-28 supra. 
253. See text accompanying notes 238-49 supra. 
254. 423 F. Supp. at 1260. 
255. Id. at 1261. See also Woodhaus v. Virginia, 487 F.2d at 890. 
256. 423 F. Supp. at 1264. 
257. /d. at 1267-74. 
258. 561 F.2d 411, 415-17 (1st Cir. 1977) . 
• 259. See cases cited at note 277 and text accompanying notes 276-77 infra. 
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leges given the general population.260 The court applied the standard 
that distinctions between protective custody prisoners and the general 
prison population must be rational, and not capricious or arbitrary?61 
Additionally, the court used the traditional eighth amendment tests of 
whether conditions "shock the conscience" or are "disproportionate" to 
the offense.262 Most of the questions of the case were remanded to as-
certain which of the remedial orders were supportable by the conven-
tional eighth amendment analysis?63 
2. Proposed Analysis 
a. Protective-punitive distinction: The first step in analyzing the 
rights of protective custody prisoners to conditions superior than those 
of punitive custody is to distinguish between the two types of confine-
ment. Punitive segregation is imposed as punishment after a discipli-
nary infraction by a prisoner; protective custody is designed to protect 
nonculpable prisoners in need of special protection from the general 
prison population. Although this point appears elementary and basic 
to the entire analysis of the rights of protective custody prisoners, two 
of the most authoritative circuit court decisions on the subject, Breeden 
and Sweet, never made this distinction. 
Instead of distinguishing between the two kinds of segregation, the 
Breeden court attempted to prove the constitutionality of the protective 
confinement precisely because it was identical to the normal maximum 
security: "With a single exception, the deprivations were the usual inci-
dents of confinement in maximum security."264 "Under petitioner's 
own claim, they are the usual and accepted regulations imposed in 
maximum security."265 The court twice referred to Breeden's confine-
ment as prison "discipline,"266 thus obscuring the central fact of the 
case: Breeden had done nothing for which to be "disciplined." 
The Sweet majority never directly confronted Sweet's complaint 
that there was no difference between the conditions of his confinement 
and those of prisoners in punitive segregation. The court's limited re-
mand with instructions for the district court to investigate whether the 
260. 561 F.2d at 416. The court noted that an earlier First Circuit case, O'Brien v. Moriarty, 
489 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1974), specifically left the issue open. 561 F.2d at 416. 
261. Id. at 416. 
262. Id. at 419 (referring to 423 F. Supp. at 1261). 
263. Id. at 420-21. 
264. 457 F.2d at 579. 
265. Id. at 581. 
266. Id. at 579, 580. 
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limited access to exercise and showers would be harmful after a long 
confinement (and thus cruel and unusual punishment) would appar-
ently have been the result for any prisoner kept in segregation for a 
long time, without regard to whether the confinement was protective or 
punitive.267 
The failure of the Breeden and Sweet majorities to make any dis-
tinction between protective and punitive custody is perhaps explained 
in part by certain factual weakncsses in each of the cases. In Breeden, 
Judge Russell's opinion implied disbelief that the prisoner actually 
needed protection. The opinion noted that although Breeden claimed 
to have been threatened with bodily harm, the threats had never been 
verified by prison officials.268 The flavor of skepticism, about the real-
ity of Breeden's need for protection269 tainted the opinion, making his 
complaints about the conditions of protective custody appear frivolous. 
The case of James Sweet also presented a factual context that was 
not conducive to a determination of the rights ofa blameless segregated 
prisoner. The opinion noted that prison authorities considered Sweet a 
"constant problem," that he had a history of punitive segregation, that 
the explanations he gave about the incidents leading up to protective 
segregation were confused and inconsistent, and further, that some of 
his factual allegations were falsepo The fact that the plaintiffs in both 
Sweet and Breeden were unsympathetic characters, however, should 
not be an excuse to ignore the constitutional issues raised by a system 
which conditions safety on the relinquishment of normal privileges.271 
The courts' failure to distinguish protective custody from punitive 
custody led to reliance on inapposite authority. The Breeden majority 
answered the question of the rights of protective custody prisoners by 
repeated citation of cases which dealt with the parameters of special 
confinement for disciplinary reasons.272 The Sweet majority did no 
better.273 In both of those cases, however, the courts referred to prior 
cases only to bolster their analysis. In Nadeau, the citation of Breeden 
and Sweet replaced independent analysis of the issues: ''The Fourth 
267. See text accompanying notes 341-55 i'!fra. 
268. 457 F.2d at 579. 
269. See text accompanying notes 222 supra. 
270. 529 F.2d at 857, 864-65. 
271. One might speculate, for instance, whether the results would have been the same if the 
plaintiff had been a middle class family man, perhaps a banker convicted of embezzlement, in 
protective custody because of threats of sexual assault. 
272. 457 F.2d at 579-81; see text accompanying notes 217-19 supra. 
273. See 529 F.2d at 859-66. 
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Circuit has squarely rejected this claim twice,"274 and "[o]ther courts 
have agreed."275 Although the court cited five cases276 (in addition to 
Sweet and Breeden) to support this proposition, even a cursory exami-
nation of the facts and reasoning of these cases undercuts their weight 
as authority on this issue;277 a mere listing of cases concerning differing 
forms of segregation is no substitute for an independent examination of 
the constitutional issues surrounding protective custody. 
274. 561 F.2d at 416. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Smith v. Swenson, 333 F. Supp. 1253 (W.O. Mo. 1971), the first case cited, dismissed the 
claim of a maximum security prisoner who was placed in maximum security not only because of 
dueats to his life, but also because he was being charged with possession of a home-made knife 
and with stabbing another prisoner. Id. at 1254. Thus, the issue of protective confinement condi-
tions was not even raised. 
In the second case, Joyner v. McClellan, 396 F. Supp. 912 (D. Md. 1975), the court granted 
summary judgment in a suit in which a prisoner in protective custody sought either a transfer or 
change in conditions, and apparently monetary relief. Id. at 913. (The judge noted that Joyner, 
who acted as his own counsel, "nowhere clearly set forth the nature of the relief sough!." Jd.) All 
but the damages claim was moot because the prisoner had been transferred two years prior to the 
decision, but the judge re~ed primarily on Breeden (and cited Smith v. Swenson at 1258) in dis-
missing the claim for damages. The importance of the case is undercut by the court's inference 
that Joyner only needed protective custody because he refused to give evidence against his attack-
ers: 
It is unfortunate that the victim, rather than the perpetrators, must be the one who bears 
the burden of segregation. But the Due Process Clause bars prison officials from segre-
gating prisoners for infractions without some evidentiary basis. Mere suspicions will not 
do, and, here, Joyner refused to give evidence against his attackers. 
Id. at 915. A realistic assessment of prison culture indicates that Joyner's need for protective 
segregation would probably have increased if he had identified his attackers, especially since the 
record shows that the stabbing was committed by members of a group of prisoners called "The 
Family," not all the members of which were known. Jd. at 914-15. 
In Hundley v. Sielaff, 407 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1975), the court explicitly followed the 
Breeden decision, after noting that the two prisoners (one of whom had alrcady been transferred) 
had filed a complaint that was "lucid for a pro se prisoner action." Jd. at 544. They sought 
transfer and privileges for a religious group that the court dismissed as "a scheme devised to 
obtain special privileges .... " Id. at 545. 
The next case cited in Nadeau, Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), actually 
dealt with the segregation of a prisoner with a record of prison escape. The court noted in dicta 
that solitary confinement was used for escape risks, punishment or protection. The last case cited, 
Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390 (D. S.C. 1976) q/f'd, 565 F.2d 159 (1977), involved an 
inmate's request to transfer out of protective custody to another institution entirely, a transfer he 
said was promised to him by corrections officials in exchange for aiding them in the collection of 
contraband weapons. Again, the court relied on Sweet and Breeden in dismissing the complaint. 
The court also noted that the complaint was not completed properly (pro se plaintill), and that the 
inference that officials solicited the prisoner's help in the weapons round-up would raise issues not 
present in Sweet or Breeden, but that "[s]uch an issue is not apparent in the pleadings as presently 
filed, and this court has too much work to do to call for additional pleadings, or stir the odorous 
pile this and other cases of this sort present." Jd. at 1396 n.15. Elsewhere the court referred to the 
"coddled prisoners of today," Jd. at 1392 n.2, and in a reference to the Sweet court's concern for 
the sanitation of protective custody prisoners, "perhaps [this court] can employ its precious time 
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b. Duty of reasonable protection: The duty of prison officials to 
provide a reasonably safe prison environment is an appropriate foun-
dation for the analysis of the rights of protective custody inmates. "A 
prisoner has a right, secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, 
to be reasonably protected from constant threat of violence and sexual 
assault by his fellow inmates, and he need not wait until he is actually 
assaulted to obtain relief.'>278 Since 1974, this principle has been re-
flected in escape cases recognizing the defense of necessity or duress 
based on the threat of assault, particularly sexual assault. In People v. 
Harmon279 an inmate escaped after having been beaten by inmates for 
not submitting to their demands, and after having his request for pro-
tective segregation refused. The court noted that "the State has a duty 
to assure inmate safety,"280 and reversed his escape conviction. The 
Supreme Court has recently eliIhinated the availability of the duress or 
necessity defense for prisoners who do not avail themselves of available 
alternatives to breaking the law (including turning themselves in at the 
first opportunity),281 but the duty to provide reasonable protection re-
mains.282 
One of the reasons that the situation of protective custody prison-
ers has been largely unexamined is that many protective custody pris-
oners have been segregated at their own request. Much of the judicial 
and talent in the research and study of the shower bath as a constitutional privilege with which the 
criminal, or any other mad dog of society, must be supplied." Id. at 1392. 
The Nadeau court cited all these cases without examining them, but rejected the order in 
Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. OIda 1974), '!ITd564 F.2d 388, 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 
1979) that required that nondisciplinary segregated prisoners be given privileges as close to those 
of the general population as possible because there was no explanatory rationale. 561 F.2d at 416. 
278. Woodhaus v. Virginia, 487 F.2d at 890; See Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 
582 (D.P.R.), '!lTd, 537 F.2d (1st Cir. 1976), '!lTd, 555 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977). 
279. 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.\Y.2d 212 (1974), '!lTd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975). 
280. 53 Mich. App. at 484, 22ON.W.2d at 213. See also People v. Luther, 53 Mich. App. 648, 
219 N.W.2d 812 (1974), '!lTd, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975) (conviction for escape re-
versed because judge told jurors that escape to avoid sexual attack was not a defense); Gardner, 
The J)efense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free 
from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110 (1975). Similar decisions have been made in Califor-
nia, see People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. llO (1974); Florida, see, Lewis 
v. State, 318 So. 2d 529 (Fla. App. 1975); Illinois, see People v. Unger, 33 Ill. App. 3d 770, 338 
N.E. 2d 442 (1975), '!lTd, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E. 2d 319 (1977); and Kentucky, see Pittman v. 
Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1974). 
281. United States v. Bailey 444 U.S. 394 (1980). See Note, Necessity Defense to Prison Es-
cape After United States v. Bailey, 65 VA. L. REV. 359 (1979); see also, Note, Escape From Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment: A Theory of Constitutional Necessity, 59 B.U.L. REv. 334 (1979); Com-
ment, From Duress to Intent: Shifting the Burden in Prison-Escape Prosecutions, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1142 (1979). 
282. 444 U.S. at 410. "We need not speculate now, however, on the precise contours of 
whatever defenses of duress or necessity are available .... " id. 
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analysis of protective custody has focused on this apparent voluntari-
ness of protective custody confinement, and has refused to offer relief to 
prisoners whose segregation is, to some extent, the product of their own 
choice. Each appeals court opinion on this issue has so far undercut 
the protective custody prisoner's claims with the assertion that the as-
signment was, after all, voluntary.283 The fact that prisoners have an 
eighth amendment right to reasonable protection challenges the notion 
that protective custody is in any meaningful way, voluntary. 
Protective custody is the method that many prison officials have 
chosen to implement their eighth amendment duty to provide reason-
able safety for vulnerable inmates.284 Protective custody is not a lux-
ury; it is the system established by prison officials for accommodating a 
threatened prisoner's eighth amendment right to be reasonably free 
from sexual and physical violence. As Judge Craven noted in his 
Breeden dissent, "[s]ince the alternative was alleged to be personal in-
jury and possible death, I think he was given no real choice."28s Judge 
Butzner made the same point for the concurring judges in Sweet: "A 
preference for solitary confinement over the probability of death is not 
a real choice."286 The nature of the choice offered is seen most clearly 
in Joyner v. McClellan,287 where Joyner was told he could return to the 
general population if he signed a form waiving the prison's liability for 
bodily injury.288 Many courts assume that the fact that the protective 
custody prisoner has chosen to remain in the special confinement oper-
ates as a waiver of Iris right to object to the protective custody condi-
tions. Yet the choice of returning to the general population is for many 
protective custody prisoners nothing more than a dangerous, cynical 
offer. The request for protective custody does not constitute a waiver of 
all claims concerning that confinement because prisoners have a consti-
283. See Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d at 579. The Sweet majority assumed that Sweet's 
custody was voluntary. Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d at 86 n.l6. They 
pointed out that the custody was "terminable at any time by him," id., ignoring the testimony of 
the warden that Sweet was "not considered dangerous to the population. I think-and I am not 
being facetious-the population is dangerous to him." ld. at 86 n.l (Butmer, J., concurring). The 
Nadeau decision also ignored the reality of the choice facing the protective custody prisoners by 
stressing that it was a voluntary decision: "prisoners may request a transfer to the general popula-
tion at any time." Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d at 412. 
284. See Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d at 867 (Butmer, J., concur-
ring). 
285. 457 F.2d at 581-82. 
286. 529 F.2d at 868. 
287. 396 F. Supp. 912. 
288. Joyner refused. ld. at 913. 
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tutional right to be reasonably protected from prison violence.289 A 
recent district court decision addressing these issues, Wojtczak v. Cuy-
ler,290 specifically rejected the prison officials argument that "by re-
questing voluntary confinement in [maximum security for his own 
protection] the plaintiff has waived the rights and privileges granted to 
prisoners in the general population."291 Instead, the WOjtczak court 
held that, "absent valid security considerations, plaintiff may not be 
required to renounce his right to reasonable protection from other in-
mates as a condition of receiving the opportunities afforded to prison-
ers in the general population."292 
The eighth amendment right to reasonable protection is more than 
a refutation of the argument that protective custody conditions are im-
mune to attack because they are assumed voluntarily; it also supports 
the position of protective custody prisoners in other ways. For exam-
ple, one emerging aspect of the duty to provide reasonable protection to 
protective custody prisoners is the duty to classify prisoners in a reason-
able manner.293 One of the most effective means of reducing prison 
violence is careful attention to classification of prisoners,294 and courts 
have begun to evaluate prison efforts to provide reasonable safety by 
examining their classification procedures. In Withers v. Levine,295 for 
example, the court found that where officials had assigned cellmates 
without any prior review of inmate characteristics or the suitability of 
the placement, an inmate who was sexually assaulted by his cellmate 
raised a successful claim that the absence of proper classification proce-
dures constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be reasonably 
free from harm.296 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the 
seriousness of the eighth amendment duty to provide reasonable safety 
by holding prison officials liable under a negligence standard once a 
289. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe. 423 F. Supp. at 1260-61. 
290. 480 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
291. Id. at 1303. 
292. 1£1. 
293. See Newman v. Alabama. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). cerl. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); 
Palmigiano v. Garrahy. 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.l. 1977). affd, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979). Bul see 
Altizer v. Paderick. 569 F.2d 812. 813 (4th Cir. 1978) (notes official discretion in classifying prison-
ers). 
294. See, e.g .• Doe v. Lally. 467 F. Supp. 1339. 1357 (D. Md. 1979). This court put forth a 
duty to classify inmates in order to identify potential victims. But note that the duty to protect (by 
segregation) can be in conflict with procedural due process rights to segregation. See Ex rel 
Miller v. Twomey. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) and text accompanying notes 181-217 supra. 
295. 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980). 
296. Id. In that case the officials placed together one inmate with a history of assaultive 
behavior and one inmate (the plaintift) with a history of concern with victimization. 1£1. at 160. 
See note 310 riifra. 
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pervasive risk of harm is established.297 The Withers opinion specifi-
cally held that "[i]t is not necessary to show that all prisoners suffer a 
pervasive risk of harm" in order to show the need for protective meas-
ures, "[i]t is enough that an identifiable group of prisoners do, if the 
complainant is a member of that group."298 Thus the Withers court has 
drawn the logical conclusion that the right of reasonable safety is espe-
cially strong for prisoners who are particularly vulnerable to victimiza-
tion. Those prisoners are, of course, the ones who seek protective 
custody. 
Once the applicability of a right to reasonable safety is established, 
analysis of the protective custody system uncovers serious due process, 
eighth amendment, and equal protection deficiencies. 
c. Substantive due process: In Wo!lf v. McDonnell,299 the 
Supreme Court reestablished that, "[p]risoners may also claim the pro-
tections of the Due Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law."3°O A procedural due 
process argument was made earlier in support of procedural safeguards 
to accompany any forced protective custody assignment, whether 
forced in or OUt.301 The issue in that case is the sufficiency of proce-
dures prior to a protective custody assignment. The substantive due 
process attack of the conditions of protective custody confinement is 
related, yet very different. The question here is whether the state's jus-
tifications for confining protective custody prisoners in punitive condi-
tions are sufficient to withstand due process inspection. Judge Craven 
clearly asserted his answer in the Breeden dissent: subjecting a "well-
behaved prisoner to deprivations imposed as punishment upon unruly 
prisoners seems to be arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."302 
This argument is grounded in notions of elementary fairness. Jus-
tice normally requires that we penalize the offender, not the victim. 
Anthony Scacco pointed out the practice of confining the victims and 
potential victims in a "prison within a prison" is a "lugubrious rem-
297. 615 F.2d at 162. 
298. Id. at 161. "It is irrelevant that larger, older men need experience no such fear, when 
younger and smaller men are frequently victimized and each such person has a reasonable basis 
for fearing that he will become a victim or will be victimized again." Id. 
299. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
300. Id. at 556. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
301. See text accompanying notes 181-217 supra. 
302. 457 F.2d at 582 (Craven, J., dissenting). 
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edy" for the problem of institutional violence.303 
The harshness of the deprivation in protective custody varies from 
prison to prison.304 The Wolff analysis was grounded in a recognition 
of the significance of the deprivation of liberty which accompanies ei-
ther the loss of good time credits or placement in solitary confine-
ment.305 The seriousness of the liberty deprivation which results from 
solitary confinement for protective reasons can be analogized to 
WO!ff,306 the protective custody prisoner arguably suffers an equal (or 
even greater)307 deprivation, although there is no doubt that he has 
done nothing to deserve it. The Wolff safeguards are designed to pre-
vent the inadvertent assignment to solitary confinement of a well-be-
haved prisoner; protective custody regulations now routinely provide 
for assignment of solitary confinement to such prisoners. 
Because the Breeden, Sweet, and Nadeau majorities used the ap-
parent voluntariness of the prisoners' assignments to protective custody 
to effectively waive the constitutional rights of the prisoners, they did 
not reach an analysis of the prisons' justifications for the practice of 
making the punitive and protective conditions equivalent. Prison offi-
cials would probably raise three justifications for the policy. Security is 
of course the prime responsibility of prison authorities, as well as their 
chief justification for resisting claims of prisoners' rights. In this case, 
however, although there are obvious security reasons for removing the 
protective custody prisoner from the general population, the security 
rationale for making the conditions of protective segregation 
equivalent to conditions of punitive segregation appears more difficult 
to establish. The poliey is more likely based on administrative effi-
ciency and cost reduction. As one court has pointed out, however, 
prison officials cannot be allowed to play "fast and loose with [prison-
ers'] basic constitutional rights in the interest of administrative effi-
ciency."308 Likewise, cost has not been held to be a legitimate obstacle 
to the preservation of constitutionally guaranteed prison conditions.309 
303. A. SCACCO, supra note 57 at 103-04. 
304. See text accompanying notes 196-204 supra. 
305. See text accompanying notes 181-88 supra. 
306. See text accompanying notes 196-205 supra. 
307. See text accompanying notes 341-55 infra. 
308. Ex rei. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957). 
309. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194,201 (8th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. 
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968). Cf. United States v. Albrook, 336 F. Supp. 937 (D. D.C. 
1971) (juveniles eligible to be sentenced to Lorton could not be denied treatment facilities because 
the institution was overcrowded). 
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A third, more specific rationale for refusing to effect any distinc-
tions between punitive and protective segregation is the prison authori-
ties' fear of making protective custody too comfortable. According to a 
gay prisoner at Terre Haute: ''They make it extremely hard for a per-
son to get on protective custody status. . . . If you are lucky enough to 
be put on P.C. status in deadlock, the officials make it very hard on 
you, by various methods."310 In the words of the 1977 Manual of Stan-
dards for Adult Correctional Institutions: "Care should be taken to en-
sure that inmates do not see placement in protective custody as 
desirable."3II Although the advice is not explained, most likely the 
deprivations of protectiv~ custody serve as a valve to control the 
number of inmates seeking such protection. In other words, prisoners 
in protective custody are penalized in order to keep others out of pro-
tective confinement. Yet this attempt to limit the desirability of protec-
tive custody might be creating an opposite effect. Corrections analysts 
have found that lack of reporting by victims is one of the major factors 
contributing to the high level of prison violence.312 They point to the 
victims' desire to avoid the conditions of protective custody status as a 
chief reason for not reporting violence.313 Thus, the poor protective 
custody conditions indirectly add to the level of violence in the general 
prison population and increase the need for protective custody place-
ment. Violations of the rights of protective custody prisoners and an 
increasing level of violence throughout the prison are the results of this 
flawed, circular policy. Efforts aimed directly at reducing violence in 
the general prison population will provide the only real long-term con-
trol on the numbers of prisoners seeking protective custody.314 Even at 
present, the problem of freeloaders (prisoners seeking protective cus-
310. Wildes, Leiter yom Terre HOUle, CELLMATE, (Oct. 1978). Wildes elaborated: 
Most deadlock cells are two-man cells. A favorite tactic used is to house a gay inmate 
with an aggressive straight inmate. The situation can become so bad that the gay inmate 
will usually choose to return to the population .... But even at best, conditions in ad-
ministrative segregation are hard to cope with. You're locked in a small cell 24 hours a 
day. You are given two or three showers a week (five minutes per shower). Sometimes 
you may be given an hour's exercise period but not on a regular basis. You are deprived 
of most of your property . You are denied access to educational programs as well as drug 
or alcohol rehabilitation programs and religious services. In short, you lire being pun-
ished for seeking protection of your life. 
Id. 
311. COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 39 (1977) (discussion of Rule 4201). 
312. See text accompanying notes 332-40 infta. 
313. Id. 
314. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.l. 1977) (almost one-fifth of the 
prison popUlation was in protective custody in spite of severe deprivations accompanying that 
status). 
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tody status although they do not really need it) could be solved with a 
system of individual, case-by-case determinations of the need for pro-
tective custody.3ls 
d. Disproportionality: ClUel and unusual punishment: The second 
constitutional basis for challenging a system of equivalent deprivations 
for punitive and protective segregation is the eighth amendment, which 
prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment." Two of the traditional tests 
for eighth amendment violations are first, whether the condition 
"shocks the conscience," and thus offends the "evolving standard of 
decency,"316 or second, whether the punishment is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the offense.317 This latter test, whether the punishment fits 
the crime, may be applied most profitably to protective custody condi-
tions which are equivalent to the conditions imposed upon prisoners 
who are being punished.318 Subjecting well-behaved prisoners to the 
same conditions which are used to punish culpable behavior appears 
grossly disproportionate. 
A possible criticism of this analysis is that application of the pro-
portionality test is inappropriate because the purpose of the restrictive 
confinement is not punishment.319 Although this argument is in tune 
with recent Supreme Court reasoning regarding pretrial detainees,32o 
the eighth amendment standard is applied to virtually all aspects of the 
treatment of convicted inmates.321 The proposal that the proportional-
ity test is avoidable if the prisoner assigned to special confinement is 
without any taint of culpability strains credulity.322 Severe confine-
ment would thus be challengeable if imposed for a slight infraction, but 
315. For a discussion of the applicability of procedural safeguards to protective custody as-
signments, see text accompanying notes 181-217 supra. 
316. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
317. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
318. The Sweet and Breeden majorities applied the first test to reach the conclusion that the 
protective custody conditions did not "shock the conscience" because they were no worse than 
punitive segregation. See text accompanying notes 264-69 supra. This test, too, might result in an 
opposite conclusion if the focus was on the nonculpability of the prisoner. 
319. See Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 944 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Fitzgerald v. Procunier, 393 F. 
Supp. 355, 342 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
320. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion limited 
"punishment" of pre-trial detainees to actions taken with a punitive purpose. ld. at 538-39. But 
see 441 U.S. at 563. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
321. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke,406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), qjf'd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
322. Of course, an argument could be made that the conditions of protective custody have 
evolved in the way that they have in part because of a punitive attitude of officials toward those 
prisoners who need protection, who are not tough enough to survive in the general prison popula-
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acceptable if imposed without any infraction. The better analysis 
would include "no offense" (apart from victim status) at the bottom 
end of the proportionality continuum.323 The proportionality test as 
applied to punitive segregation scrutinizes the confinement in light of 
the conviction and some culpable prison conduct. The proportionality 
test as applied to protective custody examines the conditions in light of 
the conviction and no culpable prison conduct. The three judges who 
concurred in Sweet applied this test: "[M]easured by the prison's own 
standards of punishment, his solitary confinement is clearly disporpor-
tionate to his conduct and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the eighth .amendment."324 
e. Equal protection: Equal protection principles were applied 
earlier to the practice of automatic segregation of gay prisoners.32S 
Equal protection limitations apply not only to protective custody classi-
fication decisions, but also to conditions of confinement after protective 
custody has been assigned. As discussed earlier, equal protection anal-
ysis.requires an examination of both the class of people distinguished 
and the nature of the interest effected by the rule in question, in order 
to determine the standard by which the government's interest in mak-
ing the classification will be reviewed.326 
The district court in Nadeau v. Helgemoe327 based its analysis on 
eighth amendment grounds rather than equal protection, because pro-
tective custody prisoners are not a "suspect class," but did note that any 
infringement of fundamental rights, such as access to the courts (via 
library privileges) or exercise of religion, would have to be justified by 
a showing of compelling state interest.328 The degree of deprivation of 
protective custody prisoners varies according to the specific conditions 
of their confinement, and might include reduced access to the library, 
limited opportunities for exercise, meals alone in the cell, fewer show-
ers, or reduced access to educational or rehabilitation programs. The 
success of an equal protection challenge to protective custody condi-
tion. q: text accompanying notes 59-71 supra (discussion of punitive attitudes toward gay prison. 
ers). 
323. See O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944-45 (1st Cir. 1974) (discusses proportionality 
analysis of segregation, citing Judge Craven's dissent in Breeden). 
324. 529 F.2d at 868. 
325. See text accompanying notes 129-33 supra. 
326. See Bice, supra note 129, at 693-707. 
327. 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), modtfied, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977). See text accom· 
panying notes 159-72 supra. 
328. Id. at 1265. 
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tions will depend largely on whether protective custody status results in 
the denial of any fundamental rights. 
Equal protection arguments for the protective custody prisoner are 
undercut by the obvious rational basis for treating protective custody 
prisoners differently (at least in terms of segregation) from the general 
population. The stronger argument comes when prison officials are 
asked to justify treating protective custody prisoners the same as puni-
tive custody prisoners. Judge Butzner noted that "placing [the protee-
tive custody prisoner] in the same class as lawless prisoners, though he 
is not lawless, denies him the equal protection of the law."329 But the 
excessiveness and irrationality problems in that comparison seem to 
point more naturally to due process and eighth amendment analyses. 
In the absence of any fundamental rights being infringed (such as de-
nial of access to religious practice), the deferential standard of review 
would probably allow the practice as long as it was supported by a 
legitimate state interest in prison security or administrative efficiency. 
Equal protection analysis does become meaningful, however, when the 
interests at stake are fundamental, or when the prisoner has been as-
signed to protective custody because he is gay. Much of the equal pro-
tection analysis of homosexuality discussed earlier in the context of 
challenges to a prison decision to automatically segregate gay prison-
ers330 is equally applicable to challenges to the conditions of protective 
custody once it has been assigned to a gay prisoner. As discussed ear-
lier, conditions imposed on a prisoner because of his status as homosex-
ual arguably should be tested by a middle level of scrutiny.331 The 
punitive conditions of protective custody confinement are much more 
likely to be struck down when this intermediate standard is applied. 
f. Penal policy considerations: Making distinctions between the 
conditions of confinement for protective and punitive custody prisoners 
is a reform that is not only constitutionally compelled, but is also sup-
ported by penological considerations. Commentators point to the lack 
of reporting by victims as a major factor leading to the widespread sex-
ual violence in prisons.332 Davis explained why victims in the Philadel-
phia prison system did not report attacks: 
[I]nmates who complain are themselves subjected to a form of pun-
329. 529 F.2d at 868. 
330. See text accompanying notes 134-68 supra. 
331. See text accompanying notes 129-50 supra. 
332. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 6; Jacobs, supra note 66, at 82. 
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ishment. It is usual procedure to put a victim of a sexual assault on 
'lock-in feed-in' obtensibly for his own protection. This means that 
after a complaint is made, and especially if it is pressed, the com-
plainant is lock in his cell all day, fed in his cell, and not permitted 
recreation, television, or exercise until it is determined that he is safe 
from retaliation. Many victims consider this 'solitary confinement' 
worse than a 'house keeping' relationship with a sexual aggressor.333 
Davis recommended providing a separate housing unit for victims of 
sexual assault where they would be allowed to enjoy separately the 
same activities allowed the general prison population.334 
Courts have recognized this problem as well. In Doe v. La/ly33S 
the court acknowledged the problem of the lack of reporting of sexual 
assaults.336 In Anderson v. Redman337 the court noted the impractical-
ity of reporting sexual assault because of the fear of reprisal,338 and 
pointed out that protective custody meant being "locked in the hospital 
area twenty-four hours per day" with "virtually no privileges."339 Both 
the National Sheriff Association's Model Compend,ium of Legislation 
and Standards and the Department of Justice's 1978 Draft Standards 
for Corrections emphasize a goal of similar conditions for protective 
custody inmates and the general prison population.340 
B. LONG-TERM PROTECTIVE CUSTODY: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
is often the prisoner's foremost protection against harsh prison condi-
tions. Courts have determined that certain specific practices and condi-
tions, such as inadequate diet,341 or physical abuse by guards,342 are 
violative of the eighth amendment. Recently courts have applied a to-
tality of conditions test in finding that an entire prison system violates 
the eighth amendment.343 The aspect of protective custody which most 
clearly raises eighth amendment concerns about the impact of the con-
finement on the prisoner is the extended duration of most protective 
333. A. DAVIS, supra note 65, at 76. 
334. Jd. at 78. 
335. 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979). 
336. Id. at 1349 n.7. 
337. 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977). 
338. Id. at 1115. 
339. Id. at 1120. 
340. COMPENDIUM, supra note 89, at 24; DRAFT STANDARDS, supra note 212, at 58·61. 
341. See, e.g., Shapley v. Wolff, 568 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1978); Cunningham v. Jones, 567 
F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1977). 
342. See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). 
343. See, e.g., Holt v. Sawer, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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custody assignments. A deprivation which is relatively minor when im-
posed as a temporary measure becomes much more serious when it is 
imposed indefinitely. Whereas punitive segregation is normally as-
signed for a fixed term, placement in protective custody is often for an 
indefinite period. For example, a prisoner assigned to protective cus-
tody because he is homosexual is likely to stay in protective custody for 
his entire term in prison. In Sweet, for instance, the court rejected 
Sweet's arguments that the conditions of his confinement in protective 
custody should be better than conditions of punitive custody,344 but re-
manded for a factual inquiry into the impact on Sweet of the lack of 
exercise and fewer showers over an extended period of time.345 Even 
where the conditions of protective and punitive custody are identical, 
the extended stay of the protective custody prisoners can make their 
deprivation more serious. Court orders limiting the period that a pris-
oner may be assigned to punitive custody346 are implicit recognition 
that the same conditions which are constitutionally permissible for dis-
yrete periods of time can become intolerable if imposed for extended 
periods. 
An aspect of protective custody confinement that has increasing 
impact the longer it is imposed is the standard requirement that protec-
tive custody prisoners spend most of the hours of each day confined in 
their own cell, instead of participating in recreation and employment 
programs throughout the prison. One of the major issues of prisoner 
litigation today is overcrowding.347 Courts have been particularly sen-
sitive to the problem of overcrowded cells when the prisoner must 
spend more time an unusually large percentage of each day confined in 
his cell. In Nelson v. Collins,348 for instance, the court found that 
double-ceiling in forty-four square foot cells was a violation of the 
eighth amendment in all circumstances, but that it was worst for pro-
tective and punitive custody prisoners because they were confined in 
their cells "virtually twenty-four hours a day."349 
344. 529 F.2d 854; see text accompanying notes 228-48 supra. 
345. 529 F.2d at 866; if. Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (emphasized 
that the length of time in segregation contributed to a finding of an eighth amendment violation in 
disciplinary segregation). 
346. See, e.g., Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 310, 326 (D.N.H. 1977). 
347. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d, 521, 536-40 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Newman v. Ala-
bama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). But see Bell v. Wolfish 
441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) (Justice Rehnquist rejects any "one man, one bed" principle in fifth 
amendment analysis of rights of pretrial detainees). 
348. 455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md.), modified, 588 F.2d 1378 (1978). 
349. 455 F. Supp. at 731. 
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In Burks v. Walsh,350 the court found that conditions in the Mis~ 
souri State Penitentiary were not violative of the eighth amendment 
except in the segregation units. The court noted the deprivations in 
protective custody, including the amount of time that the inmates were 
confined to their cells,351 and held that "to confine two inmates to the 
47.18 square foot cells of the Special Treatment Unit is plainly intolera~ 
ble, inhumane, totally unreasonable in light of the modem conscience, 
and shocking to the conscience of the Court."352 
In M CI. Concord Advisory Board v. Hal/,353 the court found that 
the protective custody conditions violated the eighth amendment, not~ 
ing that the protective custody cells were "dark holes" and "unglorified 
cages" and that there was no recreational or vocational area available 
for the use of these inmates.354 This decision specifically noted that the 
fact that the prisoners had requested protective custody did not consti~ 
tute a waiver of their right to be free of conditions violative of the 
eighth amendment.355 As these cases indicate, protective and punitive 
custody raise special overcrowding concerns because the inmate spends 
so much time each day confined in his cell. In addition, the limited 
space is particularly harmful to protective custody prisoners whose spe~ 
cial confinement lasts for months or years. 
IV. LESBIANS IN JAILS AND PRISONS 
The constitutional analysis of the segregation (or any disparate treat~ 
ment) of incarcerated lesbians is relatively simple because it is difficult 
to identify any legitimate state interest to justify such segregation. His~ 
torically lesbians have been segregated,356 but the justification appears 
to have been moral condemnation or punishment for the status of be~ 
ing a lesbian.357 That purpose would not satisfy even the most deferen~ 
350. 461 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Mo. 1978). 
351. Id. at 459-60. The court recounted one inmate's testimony that he entered protective 
custody because of "enemies in the General Population" but that he checked out because he was 
"locked up all the time." Id. at 479. On his second day back in the general prison population he 
was assaulted by three men. After his release from the hospital he chose to return to protective 
custody. Protective custody inmates remained in their cells except for three meals a day and four 
and a half hours a week. Id. at 460. 
352. Id. at 488-89. But see Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976). 
353. 447 F. Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1978). 
354. Id. at 401. 
355. Id. 
356. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. 
357. Id. 
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tial rational basis test in equal protection analysis.358 If the prison's 
stated purpose is to minimize sexual activity, segregation of lesbians is 
not rationally related to that goal, since commentators on women's 
prisons unanimously agree that lesbians represent only a small minor-
ity of inmates who are sexually active.359 (In fact, Jarvis' conclusion 
that lesbians prefer to relate to other lesbians in the prison popula-
tion360 indicates that segregation of lesbians is exactly counterproduc-
tive to a goal of reducing sexual activity). 
The important distinction between the analysis of the treatment of 
incarcerated gay men and that of incarcerated lesbians is the difference 
in the level of sexual violence in men's and women's institutions. The 
majority of this Note deals with emanations from the male gay prison-
ers' relationships to the sexual violence which is rampant in men's insti-
tutions. Although there are isolated examples of sexual violence in 
women's prisons, it is not a significant or widespread problem.361 
Therefore, the segregation of lesbian prisoners cannot be justified on 
those grounds. Of course, this Note concerns discrimination based on 
an inmate's status; sanctions for specific incidents of sexual activity, on 
the other hand, are within the traditional authority of prison officials. 
CONCLUSION 
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment, 
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment compel 
reform of the current practices of confinement of many gay prisoners. 
Six principles emerge. First, policies concerning male gay prisoners 
should be developed in the context of a possible need for protection, 
not treatment or punishment.362 Second, a man's status as homosexual 
should not be determinative of his classification within the prison pop-
ulation, although it should be one factor in making an individualized 
assessment of his need for protective custody.363 Third, due process 
requires the implementation of procedural safeguards to accompany 
each protective custody assignment, including those of gay men.364 
Fourth, constitutional principles require prison authorities to make sig-
358. q. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1972) (imprisonment for status is cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
359. See note 58 supra. 
360. Jarvis, supra note 61, at 92. 
361. See note 66 supra. 
362. See text accompanying notes 57-85 supra. 
363. See text accompanying notes 79-84, 164-68 supra. 
364. See text accompanying notes 181-217 supra. 
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nificant distinctions between the conditions of protective and punitive 
custody,365 and to explain any differences between protective custody 
conditions and general prison population conditions in terms other 
than efficiency and cost reduction.366 Fifth, the typical extended dura-
tion of protective custody heightens eighth amendment concerns about 
the daily conditions of segregated confinement. Finally, no rational ba-
sis exists for any special classification of incarcerated lesbians based 
solely on their status as lesbians.367 
Ideally, these reforms will be undertaken voluntarily by prison of-
ficials. More realistically, however, these principles will be won gradu-
ally as the most hidden part of the gay rights movement becomes 
stronger, and as prisoners bring suits to enjoin the discrimination they 
experience because they are gay. 
Joan w: Howarth 
365. See text accompanying notes 264-340 supra. 
366. See text accompanying notes 308·09 supra. 
367. See text accompanying notes 356·61 supra. 
